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Efficiency of Large Double Auctions

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Eduardo M Azevedo & Eric Budish, 2019. "Strategy-proofness in the Large," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 86(1), pages 81-116.
  2. Darrell Duffie, 2018. "Financial Regulatory Reform After the Crisis: An Assessment," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(10), pages 4835-4857, October.
  3. Itzhak Rasooly, 2022. "Competitive equilibrium and the double auction," Papers 2209.07532, arXiv.org.
  4. Xavier Vives, 2011. "Strategic Supply Function Competition With Private Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 79(6), pages 1919-1966, November.
  5. Fudenberg, Drew & Mobius, Markus & Szeidl, Adam, 2007. "Existence of equilibrium in large double auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 550-567, March.
  6. Yeon-Koo Che & Fuhito Kojima, 2010. "Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(5), pages 1625-1672, September.
  7. Loertscher, Simon & Mezzetti, Claudio, 2021. "A dominant strategy, double clock auction with estimation-based tatonnement," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 16(3), July.
  8. Zhan, Wenjie & Friedman, Daniel, 2007. "Markups in double auction markets," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 31(9), pages 2984-3005, September.
  9. Giuseppe Attanasi & Kene Boun My & Andrea Guido & Mathieu Lefebvre, 2021. "Controlling monopoly power in a double‐auction market experiment," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 23(5), pages 1074-1101, October.
  10. Bichler, Martin & Kohring, Nils & Oberlechner, Matthias & Pieroth, Fabian R., 2023. "Learning equilibrium in bilateral bargaining games," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 311(2), pages 660-678.
  11. Roberto Cervone & Stefano Galavotti & Marco LiCalzi, 2009. "Symmetric Equilibria in Double Auctions with Markdown Buyers and Markup Sellers," Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, in: Cesáreo Hernández & Marta Posada & Adolfo López-Paredes (ed.), Artificial Economics, chapter 0, pages 81-92, Springer.
  12. Itai Ashlagi & Mark Braverman & Avinatan Hassidim, 2014. "Stability in Large Matching Markets with Complementarities," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 62(4), pages 713-732, August.
  13. Bodoh-Creed, Aaron, 2013. "Efficiency and information aggregation in large uniform-price auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(6), pages 2436-2466.
  14. Sarkar, Soumendu, 2018. "Convergence of VCG mechanism to ex-post budget balance in a model of land acquisition," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 37-46.
  15. Dütting, Paul & Talgam-Cohen, Inbal & Roughgarden, Tim, 2017. "Modularity and greed in double auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 59-83.
  16. Dütting, Paul & Talgam-Cohen, Inbal & Roughgarden, Tim, 2017. "Modularity and greed in double auctions," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 83199, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  17. Satterthwaite, Mark & Shneyerov, Artyom, 2008. "Convergence to perfect competition of a dynamic matching and bargaining market with two-sided incomplete information and exogenous exit rate," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 435-467, July.
  18. Michael Peters & Sergei Severinov, 2008. "An ascending double auction," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 37(2), pages 281-306, November.
  19. Gresik, Thomas A., 2011. "The effects of statistically dependent values on equilibrium strategies of bilateral k-double auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 139-148, May.
  20. Piero Gottardi & Roberto Serrano, 2005. "Market Power And Information Revelation In Dynamic Trading," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 3(6), pages 1279-1317, December.
  21. Shafer, Rachel C., 2020. "Minimax regret and failure to converge to efficiency in large markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 281-287.
  22. Kiho Yoon, 2021. "Robust double auction mechanisms," Papers 2102.00669, arXiv.org, revised May 2022.
  23. Aaron Bodoh-Creed & Brent Hickman, 2016. "College Assignment as a Large Contest," Working Papers 2016-27, Becker Friedman Institute for Research In Economics.
  24. Satterthwaite, Mark A. & Williams, Steven R. & Zachariadis, Konstantinos E., 2014. "Optimality versus practicality in market design: A comparison of two double auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 248-263.
  25. Steven Lalley & Glen Weyl, 2015. "Quadratic Voting," Working Papers 2016-13, Becker Friedman Institute for Research In Economics.
  26. Kovalenkov, Alexander & Vives, Xavier, 2014. "Competitive rational expectations equilibria without apology," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 149(C), pages 211-235.
  27. Bodoh-Creed, Aaron L. & Hickman, Brent R., 2018. "College assignment as a large contest," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 88-126.
  28. Giuseppe Attanasi & Samuele Centorrino & Elena Manzoni, 2020. "Zero-Intelligence vs. Human Agents: An Experimental Analysis of the Efficiency of Double Auctions and Over-the-Counter Markets of Varying Sizes," Working Papers 05/2020, University of Verona, Department of Economics.
  29. Chen, Yan & Jiang, Ming & Kesten, Onur & Robin, Stéphane & Zhu, Min, 2018. "Matching in the large: An experimental study," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 295-317.
  30. Soumendu Sarkar, 2022. "Strategyproof and Budget Balanced Mechanisms for Assembly," Working papers 320, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
  31. Soumendu Sarkar, 2022. "Optimal mechanism for land acquisition," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 26(1), pages 87-116, March.
  32. Alp E. Atakan & Mehmet Ekmekci, 2021. "Market Selection and the Information Content of Prices," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 89(5), pages 2049-2079, September.
  33. Itzhak Rasooly, 2022. "Competitive equilibrium and the double auction," Economics Series Working Papers 974, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  34. Shneyerov, Artyom & Wong, Adam Chi Leung, 2010. "The rate of convergence to perfect competition of matching and bargaining mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(3), pages 1164-1187, May.
  35. Eaves, James & Williams, Jeffrey & Power, Gabriel J., 2016. "Do traders strategically time their pledges during real-world Walrasian auctions?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 109-118.
  36. Loertscher, Simon & Marx, Leslie M., 2023. "Asymptotically optimal prior-free asset market mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 68-90.
  37. Loertscher, Simon & Muir, Ellen V. & Taylor, Peter G., 2022. "Optimal market thickness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 200(C).
  38. Shirata, Yasuhiro, 2017. "First price package auction with many traders," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 71-83.
  39. Kadan, Ohad, 2007. "Equilibrium in the two-player, k-double auction with affiliated private values," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 495-513, July.
  40. Art Shneyerov, 2006. "Dynamic Matching with Two-sided Incomplete Information and Participation Costs," Theory workshop papers 815595000000000009, UCLA Department of Economics.
  41. Fuhito Kojima & Parag A. Pathak, 2009. "Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(3), pages 608-627, June.
  42. In-Koo Cho, 2004. "Monotonicity and Rationalizability in Large Uniform Price and Double Auctions," Theory workshop papers 658612000000000076, UCLA Department of Economics.
  43. Kojima, Fuhito & Manea, Mihai, 2010. "Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(1), pages 106-123, January.
  44. Loertscher, Simon & Marx, Leslie M., 2020. "Asymptotically optimal prior-free clock auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 187(C).
  45. Yoon, Kiho, 2008. "The participatory Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(3-4), pages 324-336, February.
  46. Satterthwaite, Mark A. & Williams, Steven R. & Zachariadis, Konstantinos E., 2022. "Price discovery using a double auction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 131(C), pages 57-83.
  47. Loertscher, Simon & Mezzetti, Claudio, 2019. "The deficit on each trade in a Vickrey double auction is at least as large as the Walrasian price gap," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 101-106.
  48. Tobias Widmer & Paul Karaenke & Vijayan Sugumaran, 2021. "Two‐sided service markets: Effects of quality differentiation on market efficiency," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 42(3), pages 588-604, April.
  49. McAdams, David, 2007. "On the failure of monotonicity in uniform-price auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 729-732, November.
  50. Araujo, Luis & Camargo, Braz & Minetti, Raoul & Puzzello, Daniela, 2012. "The essentiality of money in environments with centralized trade," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(7), pages 612-621.
  51. Tomoya Tajika & Tomoya Kazumura, 2019. "Non-manipulability of uniform price auctions with a large number of objects," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(2), pages 543-569, June.
  52. Al-Najjar, Nabil I. & Smorodinsky, Rann, 2007. "The efficiency of competitive mechanisms under private information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 383-403, November.
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