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The Optimal Number of Firms in the Commons: A Dynamic Approach

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Cited by:

  1. repec:tiu:tiucen:200880 is not listed on IDEAS
  2. Charles Mason & Stephen Polasky, 2002. "Strategic Preemption in a Common Property Resource: A Continuous Time Approach," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 23(3), pages 255-278, November.
  3. D. Dragone & L. Lambertini & A. Palestini, 2017. "Emission taxation, green innovations and inverted-U aggregate R&D efforts in a linear state oligopoly game," Working Papers wp2000, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
  4. Tarui, Nori & Mason, Charles F. & Polasky, Stephen & Ellis, Greg, 2008. "Cooperation in the commons with unobservable actions," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 37-51, January.
  5. Tasneem, Dina & Engle-Warnick, Jim & Benchekroun, Hassan, 2017. "An experimental study of a common property renewable resource game in continuous time," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 91-119.
  6. Croutzet, Alexandre & Lasserre, Pierre, 2017. "Optimal completeness of property rights on renewable resources in the presence of market power," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 16-32.
  7. L. Lambertini, 2014. "On the Interplay between Resource Extraction and Polluting Emissions in Oligopoly," Working Papers wp976, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
  8. McCarthy, Nancy & Sadoulet, Elisabeth & de Janvry, Alain, 2001. "Common Pool Resource Appropriation under Costly Cooperation," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 297-309, November.
  9. Basak Bayramoglu, 2006. "Transboundary Pollution in the Black Sea: Comparison of Institutional Arrangements," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 35(4), pages 289-325, December.
  10. Lori Bennear & Robert Stavins, 2007. "Second-best theory and the use of multiple policy instruments," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 37(1), pages 111-129, May.
  11. Lin Lin & Hsien-Chang Kuo & I-Liang Lin, 2008. "Merger and optimal number of firms: an integrated simulation approach," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 40(18), pages 2413-2421.
  12. Dragone Davide & Lambertini Luca & Palestini Arsen & Tampieri Alessandro, 2013. "On the Optimal Number of Firms in the Commons: Cournot vs Bertrand," Mathematical Economics Letters, De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 25-34, October.
  13. Benchekroun, Hassan & Ray Chaudhuri, Amrita, 2011. "Environmental policy and stable collusion: The case of a dynamic polluting oligopoly," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 35(4), pages 479-490, April.
  14. Benchekroun, Hassan & Gaudet, Gérard, 2015. "On the effects of mergers on equilibrium outcomes in a common property renewable asset oligopoly," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 209-223.
  15. Chermak, Janie M. & Krause, Kate, 2002. "Individual Response, Information, and Intergenerational Common Pool Problems," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 47-70, January.
  16. Ana Espinola-Arredondo & Felix Munoz-Garcia, "undated". "Entry Deterrence in the Commons with Multiple Incumbents," Working Papers 2012-1, School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University.
  17. Colombo, Luca & Labrecciosa, Paola & Simon, Leo K., 2023. "Too many or too few? On the optimal number of firms in the commons," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 121(C).
  18. Charles F. Mason & Victoria I. Umanskaya & Edward B. Barbier, 2018. "Trade, Transboundary Pollution, and Foreign Lobbying," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 70(1), pages 223-248, May.
  19. Lambertini, Luca, 2021. "Regulating the tragedy of commons: Nonlinear feedback solutions of a differential game with a dual interpretation," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 100(C).
  20. Feichtinger, Gustav & Lambertini, Luca & Leitmann, George & Wrzaczek, Stefan, 2022. "Managing the tragedy of commons and polluting emissions: A unified view," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 303(1), pages 487-499.
  21. Ellis, Christopher J., 2001. "Common Pool Equities: An Arbitrage Based Non-cooperative Solution to the Common Pool Resource Problem," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 140-155, September.
  22. List, John A. & Mason, Charles F., 2001. "Optimal Institutional Arrangements for Transboundary Pollutants in a Second-Best World: Evidence from a Differential Game with Asymmetric Players," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 277-296, November.
  23. Damania, Richard & Bulte, Erwin H., 2007. "The economics of wildlife farming and endangered species conservation," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(3-4), pages 461-472, May.
  24. Mason, Charles F. & Phillips, Owen R., 1997. "Mitigating the Tragedy of the Commons through Cooperation: An Experimental Evaluation," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 148-172, October.
  25. Dragone, Davide & Lambertini, Luca & Palestini, Arsen, 2022. "Emission taxation, green innovations and inverted-U aggregate R&D efforts in a linear state differential game," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 62-68.
  26. F. Delbono & L. Lambertini, 2014. "Optimal firm' mix in oligopoly with twofold environmental externality," Working Papers wp955, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
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