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Transboundary Pollution in the Black Sea: Comparison of Institutional Arrangements

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  • Basak Bayramoglu

Abstract

This paper analyses the transboundary pollution between Romania and Ukraine, coastal states along the Black Sea, and studies the welfare consequences of institutional arrangements for controlling this problem. To achieve this goal, we use a dynamic and strategic framework. We compare in terms of total welfare for two countries a first-best case with three different institutional arrangements: the non-cooperative game of countries, the uniform emission policy and the constant emission policy as proposed by the Black Sea Commission. Our findings indicate that the non-cooperative game provides a better level of total welfare than the other rules. Copyright Springer 2006

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  • Basak Bayramoglu, 2006. "Transboundary Pollution in the Black Sea: Comparison of Institutional Arrangements," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 35(4), pages 289-325, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:enreec:v:35:y:2006:i:4:p:289-325
    DOI: 10.1007/s10640-006-9016-0
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    Cited by:

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    2. Zhao, Laijun & Li, Changmin & Huang, Rongbing & Si, Steven & Xue, Jian & Huang, Wei & Hu, Yue, 2013. "Harmonizing model with transfer tax on water pollution across regional boundaries in a China’s lake basin," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 225(2), pages 377-382.
    3. Sedakov, Artem & Qiao, Han & Wang, Shouyang, 2021. "A model of river pollution as a dynamic game with network externalities," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 290(3), pages 1136-1153.
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    5. Charles F. Mason, 2021. "Transboundary Externalities and Reciprocal Taxes: A Differential Game Approach," Strategic Behavior and the Environment, now publishers, vol. 9(1-2), pages 27-67, July.
    6. Charles F. Mason & Victoria I. Umanskaya & Edward B. Barbier, 2018. "Trade, Transboundary Pollution, and Foreign Lobbying," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 70(1), pages 223-248, May.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Black Sea; dynamic games; environment; institutional arrangements; non-cooperative games; transboundary pollution; water pollution; C72; C73; Q5; Q53;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • Q5 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics
    • Q53 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Air Pollution; Water Pollution; Noise; Hazardous Waste; Solid Waste; Recycling

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