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Transboundary pollution in the black sea : comparison of institutional arrangements

This paper analyses the transboundary pollution between Romania and Ukraine, coastal states along the Black Sea, and studies the welfare consequences of institutional arrangements for controlling this problem. To achieve this goal, we use a dynamic and strategic framework. We compare in terms of total welfare for two countries a first-best case with three different institutional arrangements : the noncooperative game of countries, the uniform emission policy and the constant emission policy as proposed by the Black Sea Commission. Our findings indicate that the noncooperative game provides a better level of total welfare than the other rules.

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File URL: ftp://mse.univ-paris1.fr/pub/mse/cahiers2004/V04020.pdf
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Paper provided by Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1) in its series Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques with number v04020.

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Length: 39 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mse:wpsorb:v04020
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  1. de Zeeuw, A.J., 1998. "The acid rain differential game," Other publications TiSEM f6c561bf-c603-4de7-994c-e, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  2. Karp, Larry, 1992. "Social Welfare in a Common Property Oligopoly," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 33(2), pages 353-72, May.
  3. Charles Mason & Stephen Polasky, 2002. "Strategic Preemption in a Common Property Resource: A Continuous Time Approach," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 23(3), pages 255-278, November.
  4. repec:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-77117 is not listed on IDEAS
  5. Hoel, M., 1989. "Global Environmental Problems: The Effects Of Unilateral Actions Taken By One Country," Memorandum 11/1989, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
  6. List, John A. & Mason, Charles F., 2001. "Optimal Institutional Arrangements for Transboundary Pollutants in a Second-Best World: Evidence from a Differential Game with Asymmetric Players," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 277-296, November.
  7. Ing-Marie Gren, 2001. "International Versus National Actions Against Nitrogen Pollution of the Baltic Sea," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 20(1), pages 41-59, September.
  8. Charles F. Mason & Stephen Polasky, 1997. "The Optimal Number of Firms in the Commons: A Dynamic Approach," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 30(4), pages 1143-60, November.
  9. Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1991. "Strategies for the International Protection of the Environment," CEPR Discussion Papers 568, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  10. Alaouze, Chris M, 1999. "An Economic Analysis of the Eutrophication Problem of the Barwon and Darling Rivers in New South Wales," Australian Economic Papers, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(1), pages 51-63, March.
  11. Sanchirico, James N. & Wilen, James E., 1999. "Bioeconomics of Spatial Exploitation in a Patchy Environment," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 129-150, March.
  12. Gren, Ing-Marie & Folmer, Henk, 2003. "Cooperation with respect to cleaning of an international water body with stochastic environmental damage: the case of the Baltic Sea," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 33-42, November.
  13. Fernandez, Linda, 2002. "Trade's Dynamic Solutions to Transboundary Pollution," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 386-411, May.
  14. Karl-Göran Mäler & Aart De Zeeuw, 1998. "The Acid Rain Differential Game," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 12(2), pages 167-184, September.
  15. Feenstra, Talitha & Kort, Peter M. & de Zeeuw, Aart, 2001. "Environmental policy instruments in an international duopoly with feedback investment strategies," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 25(10), pages 1665-1687, October.
  16. Missfeldt, Fanny, 1999. " Game-Theoretic Modelling of Transboundary Pollution," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(3), pages 287-321, July.
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