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Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Ponti, Giovanni, 2000. "Cycles of Learning in the Centipede Game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, pages 115-141.
  2. Jeffrey Carpenter & Peter Matthews, 2002. "Social Reciprocity," Middlebury College Working Paper Series 0229, Middlebury College, Department of Economics.
  3. Duffie, Darrell & Sun, Yeneng, 2012. "The exact law of large numbers for independent random matching," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 1105-1139.
  4. repec:cdl:ucsbec:6-98 is not listed on IDEAS
  5. Hofbauer, Josef & Sandholm, William H., 2007. "Evolution in games with randomly disturbed payoffs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 47-69, January.
  6. Ellingsen, Tore & Robles, Jack, 2002. "Does Evolution Solve the Hold-Up Problem?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 28-53, April.
  7. Agostino Manduchi, 1998. "Similar Actions and Cooperation in the Centipede Played by Automata," Working Papers 98-06-053, Santa Fe Institute.
  8. Roberto Ricciuti & Alessandro Innocenti & Mauro Caminati, 2008. "Drift and equilibrium selection with human and computer players," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, pages 1-7.
  9. Boris Salazar, 2001. "¿Qué tan racional es el principio de racionalidad de Popper?," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 3(5), pages 52-77, July-Dece.
  10. Carreras, Miquel & Serra, Daniel, 1999. "On optimal location with threshold requirements," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, pages 91-103.
  11. Weibull, Jörgen & Salomonsson, Marcus, 2005. "Natural selection and social preferences," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 588, Stockholm School of Economics, revised 27 Sep 2005.
  12. Engseld, Peter & Bergh, Andreas, 2005. "Choosing Opponents in Prisoners' Dilemma: An Evolutionary Analysis," Working Papers 2005:45, Lund University, Department of Economics.
  13. Antonio Cabrales & Giovanni Ponti, 2000. "Implementation, Elimination of Weakly Dominated Strategies and Evolutionary Dynamics," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 3(2), pages 247-282, April.
  14. Josef Hofbauer & William H. Sandholm, 2001. "Evolution and Learning in Games with Randomly Disturbed Payoffs," Vienna Economics Papers 0205, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
  15. Sethi, Rajiv & Somanathan, E., 2003. "Understanding reciprocity," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 1-27, January.
  16. Uriarte Ayo, José Ramón, 2003. "A Model of Evolutionay Drift," IKERLANAK 2003-01, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
  17. Mathias Staudigl, 2010. "On a General class of stochastic co-evolutionary dynamics," Vienna Economics Papers 1001, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
  18. Poulsen, Anders, 2002. "On the Evolutionary Stability of Bargaining Inefficiency," Working Papers 02-5, University of Aarhus, Aarhus School of Business, Department of Economics.
  19. Esther Hauk & Sjaak Hurkens, 1999. "On forward induction and evolutionary and strategic stability," Economics Working Papers 408, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Sep 1999.
  20. Simon P. Anderson & Jacob K. Goeree & Charles A. Holt, 1999. "Stochastic Game Theory: Adjustment to Equilibrium Under Noisy Directional Learning," Virginia Economics Online Papers 327, University of Virginia, Department of Economics.
  21. Sandholm,W.H., 1999. "Markov evolution with inexact information," Working papers 15, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  22. Sandholm,W.H., 2003. "Excess payoff dynamics, potential dynamics, and stable games," Working papers 5, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  23. David K. Levine, 1998. "Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiment," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 1(3), pages 593-622, July.
  24. Cabrales, Antonio, 1999. "Adaptive Dynamics and the Implementation Problem with Complete Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 159-184.
  25. Somanathan, E., 1997. "Evolutionary Stability of Pure-Strategy Equilibria in Finite Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 21(1-2), pages 253-265, October.
  26. Sandholm,W.H., 2002. "Potential dynamics and stable games," Working papers 21, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  27. William H. Sandholm, 1997. "An Evolutionary Approach to Congestion," Discussion Papers 1198, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  28. Alessandro Innocenti & Mauro Caminati & Roberto Ricciuti, 2003. "Drift effect and timing without observability: experimental evidence," Department of Economics University of Siena 405, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
  29. Hauk, Esther & Hurkens, Sjaak, 2002. "On Forward Induction and Evolutionary and Strategic Stability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 106(1), pages 66-90, September.
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