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An Econometric Analysis of the Asymmetric Information, Regulator-Utility Interaction

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Philippe Gagnepain & Marc Ivaldi & David Martimort, 2010. "The renegotiation cost of public transport services contracts," Working Papers hal-00622961, HAL.
  2. Mason, Charles F. & Plantinga, Andrew J., 2013. "The additionality problem with offsets: Optimal contracts for carbon sequestration in forests," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 1-14.
  3. Francesco, Gastaldi & Lucia, Quaglino & Carlo, Stagnaro, 2012. "Il trasporto pubblico locale e la concorrenza. Cambiare paradigma per salvare il servizio: il caso ligure [Local Public Transportation and Competition. Changing Paradigm to Save the Service: The Case of Liguria]," MPRA Paper 49464, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. Philippe Gagnepain & Marc Ivaldi & David Martimort, 2013. "The Cost of Contract Renegotiation: Evidence from the Local Public Sector," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(6), pages 2352-2383, October.
  5. Sheriff, Glenn, 2006. "Empirical Calibration of a Least-Cost Conservation Reserve Program," 2006 Annual meeting, July 23-26, Long Beach, CA 21420, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
  6. Philippe Gagnepain, 2001. "La nouvelle théorie de la régulation des monopoles naturels : fondements et tests," Post-Print hal-00622947, HAL.
  7. Anna L. Paulson & Robert M. Townsend, 2003. "Distinguishing limited commitment from moral hazard in models of growth with inequality," Working Paper Series WP-03-06, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
  8. repec:hal:wpaper:hal-00710639 is not listed on IDEAS
  9. Krähmer, Daniel & Strausz, Roland, 2010. "Optimal Procurement Contracts with Pre–Project Planning," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 303, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  10. Haug, Peter, 2007. "Local Government Control and Efficiency of the Water Industry: An Empirical Analysis of Water Suppliers in East Germany," IWH Discussion Papers 3/2007, Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH).
  11. Ayako Suzuki, 2008. "Yardstick Competition to Elicit Private Information: An Empirical Analysis of the Japanese Gas Distribution Industry," ISER Discussion Paper 0709, Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka.
  12. Philippe Gagnepain & Marc Ivaldi, 2009. "Contract choice, incentives, and political capture in public transport services," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00622963, HAL.
  13. Philippe Gagnepain & Marc Ivaldi & David Martimort, 2009. "Renégociation de contrats dans l'industrie du transport urbain en France," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 60(4), pages 927-947.
  14. Lavergne, Pascal & Thomas, A., 1997. "Semiparametric estimation and testing in models of adverse selection, with an aplication to environmental regulation," DES - Working Papers. Statistics and Econometrics. WS 6221, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Estadística.
  15. Guillaume R. Fréchette & Alessandro Lizzeri & Tobias Salz, 2019. "Frictions in a Competitive, Regulated Market: Evidence from Taxis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 109(8), pages 2954-2992, August.
  16. Takalo, Tuomas & Tanayama, Tanja & Toivanen, Otto, 2008. "Evaluating innovation policy : a structural treatment effect model of R&D subsidies," Research Discussion Papers 7/2008, Bank of Finland.
  17. repec:aen:journl:ej37-4-kahnlang is not listed on IDEAS
  18. Philippe Gagnepain & Marc Ivaldi, 2017. "Economic Efficiency and Political Capture in Public Service Contracts," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 65(1), pages 1-38, March.
  19. Li, Tong, 2009. "Simulation based selection of competing structural econometric models," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 148(2), pages 114-123, February.
  20. Ivaldi, Marc & Pouyet, Jerome, 2018. "Eliciting the regulation of an economic system: The case of the French rail industry," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 21-30.
  21. Resende, Marcelo, 1999. "Productivity growth and regulation in U.S. local telephony," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 23-44, March.
  22. Thanacoody, Selvin, 2025. "Water utility network loss reduction and service quality under price cap and rate of return regulation," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 92(C).
  23. Michal Matějka & Matthias D. Mahlendorf & Utz Schäffer, 2024. "The Ratchet Effect: Theory and Empirical Evidence," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 70(1), pages 128-142, January.
  24. Pierre André Chiappori & Bernard Salanié, 2002. "Testing Contract Theory: A Survey of Some Recent Work," CESifo Working Paper Series 738, CESifo.
  25. Reiss, Peter C. & Wolak, Frank A., 2003. "Structural Econometric Modeling: Rationales and Examples from Industrial Organization," Research Papers 1831, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  26. Barbosa, Alexandro & Lima, Severino Cesário de & Brusca, Isabel, 2016. "Governance and efficiency in the Brazilian water utilities: A dynamic analysis in the process of universal access," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 43(PA), pages 82-96.
  27. Ali Yurukoglu & Claire Lim, 2014. "Dynamic Natural Monopoly Regulation: Time Inconsistency, Asymmetric Information, and Political Environments," 2014 Meeting Papers 530, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  28. Eugenio J. Miravete & Katja Seim & Jeff Thurk, 2018. "Market Power and the Laffer Curve," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 86(5), pages 1651-1687, September.
  29. Xavier d'Haultfoeuille & Philippe Février, 2007. "Identification and Estimation of Incentive Problems : Adverse Selection," Working Papers 2007-21, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
  30. Tuomas Takalo & Tanja Tanayama & Otto Toivanen, 2005. "Selection Or Self-Rejection? Applications Into A Treatment," Industrial Organization 0510002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  31. repec:hal:psewpa:hal-00710639 is not listed on IDEAS
  32. Serge Garcia, 2002. "Rendements et efficacité dans les industries en réseau : le cas des services d'eau potable délégués," Economie & Prévision, La Documentation Française, vol. 154(3), pages 123-138.
  33. Philippe Gagnepain & Marc Ivaldi, 2002. "Asymétries d'information et richesse immatérielle de l'entreprise," Revue Française d'Économie, Programme National Persée, vol. 16(3), pages 129-153.
  34. Dethier, Jean-Jacques, "undated". "Governance and Economic Performance: A Survey," Discussion Papers 279846, University of Bonn, Center for Development Research (ZEF).
  35. Ayako Suzuki, 2012. "Yardstick Competition to Elicit Private Information: An Empirical Analysis," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 40(4), pages 313-338, June.
  36. Marcelo Resende, 2010. "Capital Structure and Regulation in U.S. Local Telephony: an Exploratory Econometric Study," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 30(1), pages 392-404.
  37. Takalo, Tuomas & Tanayama, Tanja & Toivanen, Otto, 2008. "Evaluating innovation policy: a structural treatment effect model of R&D subsidies," Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 7/2008, Bank of Finland.
  38. Antonio Estache & Andrés Gómez‐Lobo, 2004. "Limits to competition in urban bus services in developing countries," Transport Reviews, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 25(2), pages 139-158, June.
  39. Martin Gaynor & Nirav Mehta & Seth Richards-Shubik, 2020. "Optimal Contracting with Altruistic Agents," University of Western Ontario, Centre for Human Capital and Productivity (CHCP) Working Papers 20203, University of Western Ontario, Centre for Human Capital and Productivity (CHCP).
  40. repec:hal:pseose:hal-00710639 is not listed on IDEAS
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