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Evaluating Traditional Share-Price and Residual Demand Measures of Market Power in the Catsup Industry

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  • Lawrence E. Haller
  • Ronald W. Cotterill

Abstract

In this paper we specify a price determination model which can test both the traditional positive interbrand price ? share hypothesis and the negative intrabrand relationship predicted by residual demand analysis. We evaluate this relationship empirically using three-dimensional panel data from the catsup industry. We find support for both hypothesized relationships, and conclude that market power exists in this industry. Further, we conclude that the results depend critically on the characteristics of the data set to be analyzed.

Suggested Citation

  • Lawrence E. Haller & Ronald W. Cotterill, 1996. "Evaluating Traditional Share-Price and Residual Demand Measures of Market Power in the Catsup Industry," Food Marketing Policy Center Research Reports 031, University of Connecticut, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Charles J. Zwick Center for Food and Resource Policy.
  • Handle: RePEc:zwi:fpcrep:031
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Connor, John M & Peterson, Everett B, 1992. "Market-Structure Determinants of National Brand-Private Label Price Differences of Manufactured Food Products," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(2), pages 157-171, June.
    2. Cotterill, Ronald W. & Haller, Lawrence E., 1994. "Market Strategies in Branded Dairy Product Markets," Research Reports 25149, University of Connecticut, Food Marketing Policy Center.
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    6. Harris, Frederick H deB, 1986. "Market Structure and Price-Cost Performance under Endogenous Profit Risk," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(1), pages 35-59, September.
    7. Wills, Robert L., 1984. "Advertising and Quality as Sources of Price Heterogeneity Among Brands of Food Products," Working Papers 203001, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics, Food System Research Group.
    8. Cotterill, Ronald W., 1994. "Scanner Data: New Opportunities For Demand And Competitive Strategy Analysis," Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, Northeastern Agricultural and Resource Economics Association, vol. 23(2), pages 1-15, October.
    9. Nelson, Philip & Siegfried, John J & Howell, John, 1992. "A Simultaneous Equations Model of Coffee Brand Pricing and Advertising," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 74(1), pages 54-63, February.
    10. Cotterill, Ronald W, 1986. "Market Power in the Retail Food Industry: Evidence from Vermont," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 68(3), pages 379-386, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Lubatkin, Michael H. & Schulze, William S. & Mainkar, Avinash & Cotterill, Ronald W., 1998. "Towards a Post-Structural View of Competition: Three Cases of Horizontal Merger," Research Reports 25150, University of Connecticut, Food Marketing Policy Center.
    2. Pampanini, Rossella & Marchini, Andrea & Diotallevi, Francesco, 2010. "A quantitative analysis of olive oil market in Italy," MPRA Paper 40638, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Ronald Cotterill & William Putsis, 2000. "Market Share and Price Setting Behavior for Private Labels and National Brands," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 17(1), pages 17-39, August.
    4. Brendstrup, Bjarne & Paarsch, Harry J. & Solow, John L., 2006. "Estimating market power in the presence of capacity constraints: An application to high-fructose corn sweetener," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 251-267, March.
    5. Ronald W. Cotterill, 2010. "Antitrust economic analysis in food marketing channels: a global perspective," Agricultural Economics, International Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 41(s1), pages 83-91, November.
    6. Peterson, Everett B. & Cotterill, Ronald W., 1998. "Incorporating Flexible Demand Systems in Empirical Models of Market Power," Research Reports 25159, University of Connecticut, Food Marketing Policy Center.

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