The lure of authority: Motivation and incentive effects of power
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- Ernst Fehr & Holger Herz & Tom Wilkening, 2013. "The Lure of Authority: Motivation and Incentive Effects of Power," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(4), pages 1325-1359, June.
- Ernst Fehr & Holger Herz & Tom Wilkening, 2010. "The Lure of Authority: Motivation and Incentive E ects of Power," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 1115, The University of Melbourne.
- Fehr, Ernst & Herz, Holger & Wilkening, Tom, 2012. "The Lure of Authority: Motivation and Incentive Effects of Power," IZA Discussion Papers 7030, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Ernst Fehr & Holger Herz & Tom Wilkening, 2012. "The Lure of Authority: Motivation and Incentive Effects of Power," CESifo Working Paper Series 4021, CESifo.
- Ernst Fehr & Holger Herz & Tom Wilkening, 2012. "The lure of authority: Motivation and incentive effects of power," UBSCENTER - Working Papers 002, UBS International Center of Economics in Society - Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
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More about this item
Keywords
Organizational behavior; incentives; experiments and contracts;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CBE-2013-01-26 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-CDM-2013-01-26 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-CTA-2013-01-26 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-EXP-2013-01-26 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-HRM-2013-01-26 (Human Capital & Human Resource Management)
- NEP-POL-2013-01-26 (Positive Political Economics)
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