Intellectual property rights in a quality-ladder model with persistent leadership
This article analyzes the effects of intellectual property rights in a quality-ladder model in which incumbent firms preemptively innovate in order to keep their position of leadership. Unlike in models with leapfrogging, granting non-expiring forward protection reduces the rate of innovation and imposing a non-obviousness requirement reduces R&D spending. It is shown that full protection against imitation, granted independently of the size of the lead, maximizes the average innovation rate.
|Date of creation:||May 2012|
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- Angus Chu, 2009.
"Effects of blocking patents on R&D: a quantitative DGE analysis,"
Journal of Economic Growth,
Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 55-78, March.
- Chu, Angus C., 2007. "Optimal Patent Breadth: Quantifying the Effects of Increasing Patent Breadth," MPRA Paper 3910, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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