IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Intellectual property rights in a quality-ladder model with persistent leadership

  • Christian Kiedaisch

This article analyzes the effects of intellectual property rights in a quality-ladder model in which incumbent firms preemptively innovate in order to keep their position of leadership. Unlike in models with leapfrogging, granting non-expiring forward protection reduces the rate of innovation and imposing a non-obviousness requirement reduces R&D spending. It is shown that full protection against imitation, granted independently of the size of the lead, maximizes the average innovation rate.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.econ.uzh.ch/static/wp/econwp078.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Department of Economics - University of Zurich in its series ECON - Working Papers with number 078.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: May 2012
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:zur:econwp:078
Contact details of provider: Postal:
Schönberggasse 1, CH-8001 Zürich

Phone: +41-1-634 21 37
Fax: +41-1-634 49 82
Web page: http://www.econ.uzh.ch/
Email:


More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Kenneth Arrow, 1962. "Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention," NBER Chapters, in: The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors, pages 609-626 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Bettina Peters, 2006. "Persistence of Innovation Stylised Facts and Panel Data Evidence," DRUID Working Papers 06-30, DRUID, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Industrial Economics and Strategy/Aalborg University, Department of Business Studies.
  3. Gastón Llanes and Stefano Trento, 2010. "Patent Policy, Patent Pools, And The Accumulation Of Claims In Sequential Innovation," Working Papers 523, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  4. Federico Etro & Dirk Czarnitzki & Kornelius Kraft, 2011. "Endogenous Market Structures and Innovation by Leaders: an Empirical Test," Working Papers 2011_04, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
  5. Aghion, P. & Howitt, P., 1989. "A Model Of Growth Through Creative Destruction," Working papers 527, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  6. Chu, Angus C. & Pan, Shiyuan, 2010. "The Escape-Infringement Effect of Blocking Patents on Innovation and Economic Growth," MPRA Paper 27233, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  7. Daron Acemoglu & Dan Vu Cao, 2010. "Innovation by Entrants and Incumbents," NBER Working Papers 16411, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Vincenzo Denicolò & Piercarlo Zanchettin, 2014. "What Causes Over‐investment in R&D in Endogenous Growth Models?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 124(581), pages 1192-1212, December.
  9. Ted O'Donoghue & Suzanne Scotchmer & Jacques-François Thisse, 1998. "Patent Breadth, Patent Life, and the Pace of Technological Progress," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(1), pages 1-32, 03.
  10. O'Donoghue, Ted & Zweimüller, Josef, 1998. "Patents in a Model of Endogenous Growth," Economics Series 56, Institute for Advanced Studies.
  11. Robert M. Hunt, 2002. "Patentability, industry structure, and innovation," Working Papers 01-13, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
  12. Chu, Angus C. & Cozzi, Guido & Galli, Silvia, 2010. "Does intellectual monopoly stimulate or stifle innovation?," MPRA Paper 29061, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  13. Athey, Susan & Schmutzler, Armin, 2001. "Investment and Market Dominance," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(1), pages 1-26, Spring.
  14. repec:dau:papers:123456789/4966 is not listed on IDEAS
  15. Reinganum, Jennifer R., 1982. "Uncertain Innovation and the Persistence of Monopoly," Working Papers 431, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  16. Segerstrom, Paul S & Zolnierek, James M, 1999. "The R&D Incentives of Industry Leaders," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 40(3), pages 745-66, August.
  17. Harris, Christopher & Howitt, Peter & Vickers, John & Aghion, Philippe, 2001. "Competition, Imitation and Growth with Step-by-Step Innovation," Scholarly Articles 12375013, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  18. Vincenzo Denicolò & Piercarlo Zanchettin, 2012. "Leadership Cycles in a Quality‐Ladder Model of Endogenous Growth," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 122(561), pages 618-650, 06.
  19. Fudenberg, Drew & Gilbert, Richard & Stiglitz, Joseph & Tirole, Jean, 1983. "Preemption, leapfrogging and competition in patent races," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 3-31, June.
  20. James Bessen & Eric Maskin, 2006. "Sequential Innovation, Patents, and Imitation," Economics Working Papers 0025, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
  21. Federico Etro, 2004. "Innovation by leaders," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 114(495), pages 281-303, 04.
  22. Jennifer F. Reinganum, 1985. "Innovation and Industry Evolution," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 100(1), pages 81-99.
  23. Angus Chu, 2009. "Effects of blocking patents on R&D: a quantitative DGE analysis," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 55-78, March.
  24. Ledezma, Ivan, 2013. "Defensive strategies in quality ladders," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 176-194.
  25. Daron Acemoglu & Ufuk Akcigit, 2012. "Intellectual Property Rights Policy, Competition And Innovation," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 10(1), pages 1-42, 02.
  26. Aghion, Philippe & Howitt, Peter, 1992. "A Model of Growth Through Creative Destruction," Scholarly Articles 12490578, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  27. Gilbert, Richard J & Newbery, David M G, 1982. "Preemptive Patenting and the Persistence of Monopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(3), pages 514-26, June.
  28. repec:kap:iaecre:v:10:y:2004:i:4:p:257-264 is not listed on IDEAS
  29. Horowitz, Andrew W & Lai, Edwin L-C, 1996. "Patent Length and the Rate of Innovation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 37(4), pages 785-801, November.
  30. Paul S. Segerstrom, 2007. "Intel Economics," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 48(1), pages 247-280, 02.
  31. Ilya Segal & Michael Whinston, 2005. "Antitrust in Innovative Industries," NBER Working Papers 11525, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  32. Cozzi Guido, 2007. "The Arrow Effect under Competitive R&D," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, vol. 7(1), pages 1-20, January.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zur:econwp:078. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Marita Kieser)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.