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Mobilität in mehrstufigen Ausbildungsturnieren
[Mobility in Multi-Stage Education Systems]

Author

Listed:
  • Konrad, Kai A.

Abstract

Netzwerke von mehrstufigen Ausbildungswegen mit Arrow’scher Filterfunktion können unterschiedliche Grade an horizontaler Mobilität aufweisen. Dabei stellt sich die Frage, wie wünschenswert Mobilität innerhalb des Netzwerks ist. In dieser Arbeit wird auf verschiedene mögliche Gefahren hingewiesen, die mit Mobilität verbunden sind. Betrachtet wird ein Netzwerk aus verschiedenen Filtern, das Akteure erfolgreich durchlaufen müssen, wenn sie sich für eine bestimmte Position qualifizieren wollen. Es werden dabei festgelegte Ausbildungspfade von aufeinander folgenden Filtern betrachtet, zwischen denen eine gegebene Anzahl von Akteuren zu Beginn wählen muss. Betrachtet werden ex-ante völlig homogene Akteure. Die Aspekte unterschiedlicher sozialer Herkunft und andere Ungleichheitsaspekte, aber auch Probleme asymmetrischer Information bleiben somit ausgeklammert. Verschiedene externe Effekte können dazu führen, dass die Mobilität zwischen Filterpfaden innerhalb des Netzwerks von Pfaden den Erwartungsnutzen aller Teilnehmer im Filternetzwerk senkt. Die Ergebnisse haben dabei strukturelle Ähnlichkeit mit dem sogenannten Braess-Paradox im Bereich der Verkehrsplanung.

Suggested Citation

  • Konrad, Kai A., 2003. "Mobilität in mehrstufigen Ausbildungsturnieren
    [Mobility in Multi-Stage Education Systems]
    ," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2003-30, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:wzbmpg:spii200330
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Education filter; multi-stage filters; networks; mobility; negative tournament externality; Braess paradox;

    JEL classification:

    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • I21 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Analysis of Education

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