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The Agency of Politics and Science

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  • Haita-Falah, Corina
  • Gerber, Anke
  • Lange, Andreas

Abstract

Motivated by the recent concerns of the scientists participating in the elaboration of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change assessment reports, we study a principal-agent relationship between a politician and a researcher that captures some stylized facts regarding the involvement of politics into scientific research. The politician contracts with a researcher in order to get some scientific advice about a policy relevant variable. The politician trades off the policy that he would implement in the absence of any reelection concerns with a desire to please voters by choosing a policy that is supported by scientific advice and that turns out to be the ``right'' policy ex post. As a consequence, the politician bribes the researcher to bias his scientific advice towards the ideal policy of the politician. We study the optimal contracts under symmetric and under asymmetric information about the researcher's ability and concern for reputation, as well as the selection of a researcher by the politician. Thereby we identify several conflicts between the interests of the voters and those of the politician.

Suggested Citation

  • Haita-Falah, Corina & Gerber, Anke & Lange, Andreas, 2015. "The Agency of Politics and Science," VfS Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 113227, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:vfsc15:113227
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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