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Währungspolitische Interdependenz der EU-Beitrittskandidaten und die Wahl eines geeigneten Wechselkurssystems

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  • Jochem, Axel

Abstract

Der vorliegende Diskussionsbeitrag entstand im Rahmen eines Forschungsprojektes über die monetäre Integration von fünf mittel- und osteuropäischen EU-Beitrittskandidaten (Polen, Tschechische Republik, Ungarn, Slowenien und Estland). Das hier vorgestellte Kapitel geht auf die währungspolitischen Interdependenzen in der Region ein und zieht daraus Schlüsse für ein geeignetes Wechselkurssystem der genannten Länder. Dabei erweisen sich die Wechselkurselastizitäten des Sozialproduktes, die Korrelation exogener Schocks und die Priorität monetärer bzw. realer Ziele als die entscheidenden Variablen. In der gegenwärtigen Situation überwiegen die Nachteile fester Wechselkurse, die aus einer verminderten Reaktionsfähigkeit auf exogene Schocks beruhen, die Vorteile einer verringerten Wechselkursvolatilität. Der intensive Wettbewerb innerhalb Mittel- und Osteuropas (MOE) um Exporte in die EU und eine wachsende Bedeutung stabiler Wechselkurse gegenüber dem Euro könnten in der Zukunft allerdings einen gemeinsamen Übergang zu festen Wechselkursen sinnvoll erscheinen lassen. Gleichwohl bleibt ein generelles Fixkursregime einer währungspolitischen Koordination, etwa in Gestalt einer Schlange im Tunnel, in jedem Fall unterlegen.

Suggested Citation

  • Jochem, Axel, 1999. "Währungspolitische Interdependenz der EU-Beitrittskandidaten und die Wahl eines geeigneten Wechselkurssystems," Working Papers in Economics 1999,5, Bundeswehr University Munich, Economic Research Group.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:ubwwpe:19995
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Sell, Friedrich L., 2007. "More about economic and non-economic determinants of (mutual) trust and trustworthiness," Working Papers in Economics 2007,2, Bundeswehr University Munich, Economic Research Group.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    EWU; Transformationsländer; Wechselkurspolitik; Spieltheorie; EMU; Economies in Transition; Exchange Rate Policy; Game Theory;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • F42 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - International Policy Coordination and Transmission

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