Minority Voting and Public Project Provision
We propose a two-stage process called minority voting to allocate public projects in a polity. In the first period, a society decides by a simple majority decision whether to provide the public project. If the proposal in the first period is rejected, the process ends. Otherwise the process continues, but only the members of the minority keep agenda and voting rights for the second stage, in which the financing scheme is determined. In the second stage, the unanimity rule or the simple majority rule is applied. We provide a first round of relative welfare comparisons between minority voting and simple majority voting and outline our research program.
|Date of creation:||2007|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Kiellinie 66, D-24105 Kiel|
Phone: +49 431 8814-1
Fax: +49 431 8814528
Web page: http://www.economics-ejournal.org/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Theresa Fahrenberger & Hans Gersbach, 2008.
"Minority Voting and Long-term Decisions,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
2198, CESifo Group Munich.
- Casella, Alessandra, 2002.
CEPR Discussion Papers
3508, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Philippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, 2003.
"Incomplete Social Contracts,"
Journal of the European Economic Association,
MIT Press, vol. 1(1), pages 38-67, 03.
- Philipson, Tomas J & Snyder, James M, Jr, 1996. "Equilibrium and Efficiency in an Organized Vote Market," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 89(3-4), pages 245-65, December.
- Casella, Alessandra & Gelman, Andrew & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2003.
"An Experimental Study of Storable Votes,"
1173, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Casella, Alessandra & Gelman, Andrew & Palfrey, Thomas R, 2003. "An Experimental Study of Storable Votes," CEPR Discussion Papers 4081, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Alessandra Casella & Andrew Gelman & Thomas R. Palfrey, 2003. "An Experimental Study of Storable Votes," NBER Working Papers 9982, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Matthew O Jackson & Hugo F Sonnenschein, 2007. "Overcoming Incentive Constraints by Linking Decisions -super-1," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(1), pages 241-257, 01.
- Antonio Rangel, 2002. "How to Protect Future Generations Using Tax Base Restrictions," NBER Working Papers 9179, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Antonio Rangel, 2005. "How to Protect Future Generations Using Tax-Base Restrictions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(1), pages 314-346, March.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:ifwedp:5567. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ZBW - German National Library of Economics)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.