Short-term Deviations from Simple Majority Voting
I discuss instances where a committee wants to deviate from the simple majority rule by adopting an alternative voting scheme for two consecutive binary ballots. The alternative voting rule, called Minority Voting as an Exception (MVE), works as follows: In the first ballot a b-majority rule is used, where b
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- Theresa Fahrenberger & Hans Gersbach, 2007.
"Minority Voting and Long-term Decisions,"
CER-ETH Economics working paper series
07/70, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
- Rafael Hortala-Vallve, 2012.
Journal of Theoretical Politics,
, vol. 24(4), pages 526-554, October.
- Casella, Alessandra, 2002.
CEPR Discussion Papers
3508, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- James Coleman, 1983. "Recontracting, trustworthiness, and the stability of vote exchanges," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 40(1), pages 89-94, January.
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