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Preferences for harmony and minority voting

  • Fahrenberger, Theresa C.
  • Gersbach, Hans

We examine repeated collective decisions in which people care about how others are treated. We formulate the notion of preferences for harmony as the desire of a person that others should not suffer repeatedly from the tyranny of majorities. We suggest that minority voting is a suitable scheme for such problems. Under such a scheme, only members of the minority in one decision are allowed to vote in the next decision. We discuss a variety of applications and avenues for future research.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Mathematical Social Sciences.

Volume (Year): 63 (2012)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 1-13

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Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:63:y:2012:i:1:p:1-13
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  1. Bruno Frey & Matthias Benz & Alois Stutzer, 2004. "Introducing Procedural Utility: Not Only What, but Also How Matters," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 160(3), pages 377-, September.
  2. Martin Sandbu, 2008. "Axiomatic foundations for fairness-motivated preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 31(4), pages 589-619, December.
  3. Gersbach, Hans, 2007. "Minority Voting and Public Project Provision," Economics Discussion Papers 2007-20, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
  4. Theresa Fahrenberger & Hans Gersbach, 2008. "Minority Voting and Long-term Decisions," CESifo Working Paper Series 2198, CESifo Group Munich.
  5. Volker Hahn, 2007. "Fairness and voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 28(4), pages 591-605, June.
  6. Sen, Amartya, 1995. "Rationality and Social Choice," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 1-24, March.
  7. Volker Hahn, 2007. "Fairness and voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 28(4), pages 607-607, June.
  8. Hans Gersbach, 2011. "On the limits of democracy," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 201-217, July.
  9. Eyal Baharad & Shmuel Nitzan, 2007. "The Costs of Implementing the Majority Principle: The Golden Voting Rule," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 31(1), pages 69-84, April.
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