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Preferences for harmony and minority voting


  • Fahrenberger, Theresa C.
  • Gersbach, Hans


We examine repeated collective decisions in which people care about how others are treated. We formulate the notion of preferences for harmony as the desire of a person that others should not suffer repeatedly from the tyranny of majorities. We suggest that minority voting is a suitable scheme for such problems. Under such a scheme, only members of the minority in one decision are allowed to vote in the next decision. We discuss a variety of applications and avenues for future research.

Suggested Citation

  • Fahrenberger, Theresa C. & Gersbach, Hans, 2012. "Preferences for harmony and minority voting," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 1-13.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:63:y:2012:i:1:p:1-13 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2011.06.002

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Fahrenberger, Theresa & Gersbach, Hans, 2010. "Minority voting and long-term decisions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 329-345, July.
    2. Bruno Frey & Matthias Benz & Alois Stutzer, 2004. "Introducing Procedural Utility: Not Only What, but Also How Matters," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 160(3), pages 377-377, September.
    3. Volker Hahn, 2007. "Fairness and voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 28(4), pages 591-605, June.
    4. repec:cup:apsrev:v:96:y:2002:i:04:p:745-754_00 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Martin Sandbu, 2008. "Axiomatic foundations for fairness-motivated preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 31(4), pages 589-619, December.
    6. Gersbach, Hans, 2009. "Minority voting and public project provision," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW), vol. 3, pages 1-40.
    7. Eyal Baharad & Shmuel Nitzan, 2007. "The Costs of Implementing the Majority Principle: The Golden Voting Rule," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 31(1), pages 69-84, April.
    8. Hans Gersbach, 2011. "On the limits of democracy," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 37(2), pages 201-217, July.
    9. Sen, Amartya, 1995. "Rationality and Social Choice," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 1-24, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Hans Gersbach & Kamali Wickramage, 2015. "Balanced Voting," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 15/209, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.

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