Preferences for harmony and minority voting
We examine repeated collective decisions in which people care about how others are treated. We formulate the notion of preferences for harmony as the desire of a person that others should not suffer repeatedly from the tyranny of majorities. We suggest that minority voting is a suitable scheme for such problems. Under such a scheme, only members of the minority in one decision are allowed to vote in the next decision. We discuss a variety of applications and avenues for future research.
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