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Self-Starters Are Leaders: Present-Bias Asymmetry and Collective Procrastination

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  • Hattori, Keisuke

Abstract

Teamwork can either cure or create procrastination. We trace this to guilt: present-biased members who break a joint plan feel guilt that is largest when one shirks alone and smallest when failure is shared-an ordering we derive from a single monotonicity of second-order beliefs rather than impose. The resulting coordination game traps the team in collective procrastination only under symmetry. Two kinds of member break the symmetry and lead the team out, both by acting as a self-starter-one who acts whatever the partner does. The first has the disposition by type: enough follow-through to act unconditionally, she does exactly what a committed visible leader would. The second acquires it by foresight: a sophisticated member who anticipates her own delay pays to commit, making herself a self-starter where her type alone would not. A self-starter is thus an endogenous leader, supplied by heterogeneity when present bias differs across members and by self-commitment when it does not.

Suggested Citation

  • Hattori, Keisuke, 2026. "Self-Starters Are Leaders: Present-Bias Asymmetry and Collective Procrastination," EconStor Preprints 341671, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:esprep:341671
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    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/341671/1/SelfStarters-master.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Charness, Gary & Dufwenberg, Martin, 2003. "Promises & Partnership," Research Papers in Economics 2003:3, Stockholm University, Department of Economics.
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    4. Hermalin, Benjamin E, 1998. "Toward an Economic Theory of Leadership: Leading by Example," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(5), pages 1188-1206, December.
    5. Gary Charness & Martin Dufwenberg, 2006. "Promises and Partnership," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(6), pages 1579-1601, November.
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
    • M54 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Labor Management

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