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"Facta Non Verba": an experiment on pledging and giving

Author

Listed:
  • Angela Sutan

    (BSB - Burgundy School of Business (BSB) - Ecole Supérieure de Commerce de Dijon Bourgogne (ESC))

  • Gilles Grolleau

    (LAMETA - Laboratoire Montpelliérain d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - UM1 - Université Montpellier 1 - UPVM - Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - Montpellier SupAgro - Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier, CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - FRE2010 - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier, BSB - Burgundy School of Business (BSB) - Ecole Supérieure de Commerce de Dijon Bourgogne (ESC))

  • Guillermo Mateu

    (BSB - Burgundy School of Business (BSB) - Ecole Supérieure de Commerce de Dijon Bourgogne (ESC))

  • Radu Vranceanu

    (ESSEC Business School and THEMA (UMR 8184) - ESSEC Business School - THEMA - Théorie économique, modélisation et applications - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - CY - CY Cergy Paris Université)

Abstract

We design an experiment to investigate whether asking people to state how much they will donate to a charity (i.e., to pledge) increases their actual donation. Individuals' endowment is either certain or a random variable. We study different types of pledges, namely, private, public and irrevocable, which differ in terms of the cost to the individual for not keeping the promise. We show that in absence of endowment uncertainty, private and public pledges are associated with lower donations as compared to donations in the no-pledge case: private pledges slightly reduce donations and public pledges reduce them more significantly. Donations increase with uncertainty (in terms of increased endowment dispersion) for both private and public pledge situations, although donations with private pledges remain higher than donations with public pledge.

Suggested Citation

  • Angela Sutan & Gilles Grolleau & Guillermo Mateu & Radu Vranceanu, 2018. ""Facta Non Verba": an experiment on pledging and giving," Post-Print hal-01992416, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01992416
    DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2018.01.006
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    Cited by:

    1. Damien Besancenot & Radu Vranceanu, 2019. "Pledges as a Social Influence Device: Experimental Evidence," Working Papers hal-02176269, HAL.
    2. Jianbiao Li & Ruqian Zang & Xiaofei Niu, 2024. "I swear, I would like to donate later," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 27(5), pages 1158-1183, November.
    3. C. Mónica Capra & Bing Jiang & Yuxin Su, 2022. "Do pledges lead to more volunteering? An experimental study," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 60(1), pages 87-100, January.
    4. Nicholas A. Wright & Puneet Arora & Jesse Wright, 2024. "I Promise to Work Hard: The Impact of a Non-Binding Commitment Pledge on Academic Performance," Working Papers 2411, Florida International University, Department of Economics.
    5. Besancenot, Damien & Vranceanu, Radu, 2021. "The generosity spillover effect of pledges in a two-person giving game," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 90(C).

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
    • D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers

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