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Mathematical Taxonomy of Health Insurance Models: Conventional Approaches and the Emergent C&C Paradigm

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  • Dror, David Mark

Abstract

This paper introduces a formal mathematical taxonomy of four principal health insurance models: Bismarckian, Beveridgean, Commercial, and Collaborative & Contributive (C&C). Each model is analyzed for its structural characteristics, sustainability conditions, and demographic resilience under stress. Unique to the C&C model is the incorporation of trust as a variable affecting sustainability and participation. By comparing the equilibrium and value functions across models, the paper reveals fundamental differences in their capacity to withstand demographic and financial pressures. The proposed taxonomy enhances both theoretical understanding and practical evaluation of global health insurance systems.

Suggested Citation

  • Dror, David Mark, 2025. "Mathematical Taxonomy of Health Insurance Models: Conventional Approaches and the Emergent C&C Paradigm," EconStor Preprints 315551, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:esprep:315551
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Peter Zweifel & Friedrich Breyer, 2012. "The Economics of Social Health Insurance," Chapters, in: Andrew M. Jones (ed.), The Elgar Companion to Health Economics, Second Edition, chapter 12, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    2. Dror, David Mark & Radermacher, Ralf & Koren, Ruth, 2007. "Willingness to pay for health insurance among rural and poor persons: Field evidence from seven micro health insurance units in India," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 12-27, June.
    3. Cutler, David M. & Zeckhauser, Richard J., 2000. "The anatomy of health insurance," Handbook of Health Economics, in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 11, pages 563-643, Elsevier.
    4. Pietro Tebaldi, 2022. "Estimating Equilibrium in Health Insurance Exchanges: Price Competition and Subsidy Design under the ACA," NBER Working Papers 29869, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Mladovsky, Philipa, 2014. "Why do people drop out of community-based health insurance?: findings from an exploratory household survey in Senegal," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 55820, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    6. Böhm, Katharina & Schmid, Achim & Götze, Ralf & Landwehr, Claudia & Rothgang, Heinz, 2013. "Five types of OECD healthcare systems: Empirical results of a deductive classification," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 113(3), pages 258-269.
    7. Kutzin, Joseph, 2001. "A descriptive framework for country-level analysis of health care financing arrangements," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 56(3), pages 171-204, June.
    8. David M. Dror & Christian Jacquier, 1999. "Micro‐insurance: Extending Health Insurance to the Excluded," International Social Security Review, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 52(1), pages 71-97.
    9. Francesco Decarolis & Maria Polyakova & Stephen P. Ryan, 2020. "Subsidy Design in Privately Provided Social Insurance: Lessons from Medicare Part D," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 128(5), pages 1712-1752.
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    11. Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 90(4), pages 629-649.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Mathematical taxonomy; Healthcare financing; Health insurance models; Mathematical modeling; Demographic resilience; System equilibrium; Risk pooling; Sustainability thresholds; Bismarckian system; Beveridgean system; Commercial insurance; Collaborative and Contributive (C&C) model; Trust dynamics;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • I13 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Insurance, Public and Private

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