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Public policy and venture capital financed innovation: A contract design approach

  • Hirsch, Julia
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    The effects of public policy programs which aim at internalizing spill-overs due to successful innovation are analyzed in a sequential double-sided moral hazard doublesided adverse selection framework. The central focus lies in analyzing their impact on contract design. We show that in our framework only ex post grants are a robust instrument for implementing the first-best situation, whereas the success of guarantee programs, ex ante grants and some types of investment grants depends strongly on the characteristics of the project: in certain cases they not only give no further incentives but even destroy contract mechanisms and so worsen the outcome.

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    File URL: http://econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/25495/1/527430188.PDF
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    Paper provided by Center for Financial Studies (CFS) in its series CFS Working Paper Series with number 2006/29.

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    Date of creation: 2006
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    Handle: RePEc:zbw:cfswop:200629
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    1. Romer, Paul M, 1986. "Increasing Returns and Long-run Growth," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(5), pages 1002-37, October.
    2. Da Rin, Marco & Nicodano, Giovanna & Sembenelli, Alessandro, 2006. "Public policy and the creation of active venture capital markets," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(8-9), pages 1699-1723, September.
    3. Repullo, R. & Suarez, J., 1998. "Venture Capital Finance: a Security Design Approach," Papers 9804, Centro de Estudios Monetarios Y Financieros-.
    4. Christian Keuschnigg & Soren Bo Nielsen, 2000. "Tax Policy, Venture Capital, and Entrepreneurship," NBER Working Papers 7976, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Catherine Casamatta, 2003. "Financing and Advising: Optimal Financial Contracts with Venture Capitalists," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(5), pages 2059-2086, October.
    6. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 2001. "Financial Systems, Industrial Structure, and Growth," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 17(4), pages 467-482.
    7. Tykvová, Tereza, 2000. "What do economists tell us about venture capital contracts?," ZEW Discussion Papers 00-62, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
    8. Keuschnigg, Christian, 2003. "Optimal Public Policy for Venture Capital Backed Innovation," CEPR Discussion Papers 3850, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    9. Aghion, Philippe & Howitt, Peter, 1992. "A Model of Growth through Creative Destruction," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(2), pages 323-51, March.
    10. Steven N. Kaplan & Per Stromberg, 2003. "Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 70(2), pages 281-315, 04.
    11. Josh Lerner, 2002. "When Bureaucrats Meet Entrepreneurs: The Design of Effective "Public Venture Capital" Programmes," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(477), pages F73-F84, February.
    12. Steven N. Kaplan & Per Str�mberg, 2003. "Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 70(2), pages 281-315.
    13. Aghion, Philippe & Howitt, Peter, 1992. "A Model of Growth Through Creative Destruction," Scholarly Articles 12490578, Harvard University Department of Economics.
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