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Az állami támogatás hatása a projektfinanszírozásra erkölcsi kockázat és pozitív externáliák mellett. Szerződéselméleti megközelítés
[The impact of state subsidy on project financing under moral hazard and positive externalities]

Author

Listed:
  • Berlinger, Edina
  • Juhász, Péter
  • Lovas, Anita

Abstract

Elméletben és gyakorlatban is tisztázatlan az a kérdés, hogyan hat az állami támogatás a vállalkozó viselkedésére és ezen keresztül a gazdasági növekedésre. Abban viszonylag nagy az egyetértés, hogy az állam jelenléte a finanszírozásban rontja az ösztönzőket, de abban már megoszlanak a vélemények, hogy ha figyelembe vesszük az externális hatásokat, akkor az állami támogatások hatásainak eredője nem válik-e mégis pozitívvá. Számos szerző foglalkozik azzal a kérdéssel is, hogy az egyes támogatási formák (visszatérítendő/vissza nem térítendő, kezdeti/utólagos, feltételes/feltétel nélküli) közül melyik az optimális. Mi egy háromszereplős (állam, vállalkozó, magánfinanszírozó) modell keretében megmutatjuk, hogy egyszeres erkölcsi kockázat és pozitív externáliák mellett az állami támogatás értéket teremt, sőt a helyesen megtervezett támogatási rendszer nem rontja, hanem kifejezetten javítja az ösztönzőket, ezáltal nem kiszorítja, hanem katalizálja a magánfinanszírozást. A konkrét támogatási forma megválasztása azonban semleges, mivel optimumban ugyanazt a jóléti hatást lehet elérni mindegyikkel. Kivétel ez alól a minden esetben visszatérítendő állami hitel, mert annak semmiféle gazdaságélénkítő hatása nincs a modell keretei között.* Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) kód: D28, D86, G38, H23, H81.

Suggested Citation

  • Berlinger, Edina & Juhász, Péter & Lovas, Anita, 2015. "Az állami támogatás hatása a projektfinanszírozásra erkölcsi kockázat és pozitív externáliák mellett. Szerződéselméleti megközelítés [The impact of state subsidy on project financing under moral ha," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(2), pages 139-171.
    • Handle: RePEc:ksa:szemle:1533
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Fliszár, Vilmos, 2015. "Csökkenthető-e a referencia-kamatlábak manipulálásának valószínűsége?. Lehetséges irányok egy egyszerűsített modell alapján [Can reference interest-rate manipulation be decreased?. Possible directi," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(11), pages 1158-1171.
    2. Berlinger, Edina, 2017. "A piac és az állam szerepe az innovációban - Kornai János versus Joseph E. Stiglitz [The roles of the market and the state in innovation János Kornai versus Joseph E. Stiglitz]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(4), pages 377-393.
    3. Gyorgy Vas, 2017. "The Moral Hazard issues of the State-Aid Programs for SME’s," Proceedings- 11th International Conference on Mangement, Enterprise and Benchmarking (MEB 2017),, Óbuda University, Keleti Faculty of Business and Management.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • H81 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Governmental Loans; Loan Guarantees; Credits; Grants; Bailouts

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