IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/ifwkwp/1117.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Venture Capitalists Investment Incentives Under Public Equity Schemes

Author

Listed:
  • Schertler, Andrea

Abstract

This paper analyses the impact of public equity schemes on venture capitalist's incentives to finance start-up enterprises and to support the management teams. In a double-sided moral hazard model, it is shown that experienced venture capitalists, who have already financed start-up enterprises, reduce their intensity of management support under public equity schemes. However, public equity offers inexperienced venture capitalists, who have not yet financed start-up enterprises because of insuf-ficient experience, incentives to enter the venture capital market so that they can start to accumulate experience.

Suggested Citation

  • Schertler, Andrea, 2002. "Venture Capitalists Investment Incentives Under Public Equity Schemes," Kiel Working Papers 1117, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:ifwkwp:1117
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/17781/1/kap1117.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Klaus M. Schmidt, 2003. "Convertible Securities and Venture Capital Finance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(3), pages 1139-1166, June.
    2. Christian Keuschnigg & Soren Nielsen, 2001. "Public Policy for Venture Capital," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 8(4), pages 557-572, August.
    3. Samuel Kortum & Josh Lerner, 2000. "Assessing the Contribution of Venture Capital to Innovation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 31(4), pages 674-692, Winter.
    4. Rafael Repullo & Javier Suarez, 2004. "Venture Capital Finance: A Security Design Approach," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 8(1), pages 75-108.
    5. Admati, Anat R & Pfleiderer, Paul, 1994. "Robust Financial Contracting and the Role of Venture Capitalists," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 49(2), pages 371-402, June.
    6. Brav, Alon & Gompers, Paul A, 1997. "Myth or Reality? The Long-Run Underperformance of Initial Public Offerings: Evidence from Venture and Nonventure Capital-Backed Companies," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(5), pages 1791-1821, December.
    7. Schertler, Andrea, 2000. "The Impact of Public Subsidies on Venture Capital Investments in Start-Up Enterprises," Kiel Working Papers 1018, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Schertler, Andrea, 2002. "Comparative Advantages of Public Loan and Public Equity Schemes in Venture Capital Markets," Kiel Working Papers 1118, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    2. Wolf, Björn, 2006. "Empirische Untersuchung zu den Einflussfaktoren der Finanzierungsprobleme junger Unternehmen in Deutschland und deren Auswirkungen auf die Wirtschaftspolitik," Working Papers "Firms and Region" U1/2006, Fraunhofer Institute for Systems and Innovation Research (ISI).
    3. Berlinger, Edina & Juhász, Péter & Lovas, Anita, 2015. "Az állami támogatás hatása a projektfinanszírozásra erkölcsi kockázat és pozitív externáliák mellett. Szerződéselméleti megközelítés [The impact of state subsidy on project financing under moral ha," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(2), pages 139-171.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Andrew Metrick & Ayako Yasuda, 2011. "Venture Capital and Other Private Equity: a Survey," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 17(4), pages 619-654, September.
    2. Andrea Schertler, 2007. "Knowledge Capital and Venture Capital Investments: New Evidence from European Panel Data," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 8(1), pages 64-88, February.
    3. Rin, Marco Da & Hellmann, Thomas & Puri, Manju, 2013. "A Survey of Venture Capital Research," Handbook of the Economics of Finance, in: G.M. Constantinides & M. Harris & R. M. Stulz (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Finance, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 573-648, Elsevier.
    4. Christian Keuschnigg & Soren Bo Nielsen, 2003. "Taxes and Venture Capital Support," Review of Finance, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 515-539.
    5. Douglas Cumming & Sofia Johan, 2007. "Advice and monitoring in venture finance," Financial Markets and Portfolio Management, Springer;Swiss Society for Financial Market Research, vol. 21(1), pages 3-43, March.
    6. Keuschnigg, Christian & Nielsen, Soren Bo, 2004. "Start-ups, venture capitalists, and the capital gains tax," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(5), pages 1011-1042, April.
    7. Tereza Tykvová, 2007. "What Do Economists Tell Us About Venture Capital Contracts?," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(1), pages 65-89, February.
    8. Da Rin, Marco & Nicodano, Giovanna & Sembenelli, Alessandro, 2006. "Public policy and the creation of active venture capital markets," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(8-9), pages 1699-1723, September.
    9. Cumming, Douglas, 2007. "Government policy towards entrepreneurial finance: Innovation investment funds," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 193-235, March.
    10. Cumming, Douglas & Johan, Sofia Atiqah binti, 2008. "Preplanned exit strategies in venture capital," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 52(7), pages 1209-1241, October.
    11. Cumming, Douglas & Schmidt, Daniel & Walz, Uwe, 2004. "Legality and venture governance around the world," CFS Working Paper Series 2004/17, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
    12. Cumming, Douglas J., 2005. "Capital structure in venture finance," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 550-585, June.
    13. Bhanot, Karan & Kadapakkam, Palani-Rajan, 2022. "Pay for performance, partnership success, and the internal organization of venture capital firms," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 75(C).
    14. Gerard Llobet & Javier Suarez, 2010. "Entrepreneurial Innovation, Patent Protection and Industry Dynamics," Working Papers wp2010_1001, CEMFI.
    15. Robert E. Hall & Susan E. Woodward, 2010. "The Burden of the Nondiversifiable Risk of Entrepreneurship," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(3), pages 1163-1194, June.
    16. Kanniainen, Vesa & Keuschnigg, Christian, 2004. "Start-up investment with scarce venture capital support," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 28(8), pages 1935-1959, August.
    17. Ouidad Yousfi, 2012. "Financial Capital Structure in LBO Project Under Asymmetric Information," Post-Print hal-00813878, HAL.
    18. Ola Bengtsson & S. Abraham Ravid, 2015. "Location Specific Styles and US Venture Capital Contracting," Quarterly Journal of Finance (QJF), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 5(03), pages 1-40, September.
    19. Hall, Bronwyn H. & Lerner, Josh, 2010. "The Financing of R&D and Innovation," Handbook of the Economics of Innovation, in: Bronwyn H. Hall & Nathan Rosenberg (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Innovation, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 0, pages 609-639, Elsevier.
    20. Christian Keuschnigg & Søren Bo Nielsen, 2004. "Taxation and Venture Capital Backed Entrepreneurship," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 11(4), pages 369-390, August.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Double-sided moral hazard; public equity; venture capital;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:ifwkwp:1117. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/iwkiede.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.