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Információs paradoxon a vállalkozások hitelezésében nem fizető vevő esetén
[An innovation paradox in enterprise financing where buyers fail to pay]

  • Csóka, Péter

    ()

  • Havran, Dániel

    ()

  • Szűcs, Nóra

    ()

Cikkünkben a vállalkozók külső finanszírozásának modelljét terjesztjük ki arra az - irodalom által eddig nem tárgyalt - esetre, amikor a vállalkozónak van nem fizető vevője. Szerződéselméleti megközelítésünkben a vállalkozó hitelképességére vonatkozó információ aszimmetrikus a tranzakcióban részt vevő felek között, s ez morális kockázatnak ad teret. Megfigyelhető, hogy ilyenkor a pontosan fizető vevők számára is hitelszűke lép fel. A vállalkozó és a finanszírozó közötti optimális szerződés nem fizető vevő hatására további hitelszűkösséget generál. Két esetet vizsgálunk: az egyikben a vállalkozó információs előnyben van a vevő nemfizetésére vonatkozóan, a másikban nincs ilyen előny. A két modellváltozat alapján információs paradoxon jellemzi a kialakuló finanszírozási helyzetet: a vállalkozó kisebb összegű hitelhez jut az említett információs előnye esetén, mint amikor közte és a finanszírozó között szimmetrikus az információ. A modell azt a - magyar kis- és középvállalkozóknál látott - jelenséget írja le, amikor nem transzparens a szállító-vevő viszonya, és a finanszírozó bank e miatt az információs hátrány miatt kevesebb hitelt nyújt kis- és középvállalati ügyfeleinek. Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) kód: G32, G33, D86.

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Article provided by Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation) in its journal Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences).

Volume (Year): LVII (2010)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Pages: 318-336

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Handle: RePEc:ksa:szemle:1161
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