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Effectiveness of Bailouts in the EU

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  • Ela Glowicka

Abstract

Governments in the EU frequently bail out firms in distress by granting state aid. I use data from 86 cases during the years 1995-2003 to examine two issues: the impact of bailouts on bankruptcy probability and the determinants of bailout policy. I have three main results. First, the estimated discrete-time hazard rate increases during the first four years after the subsidy and drops after that, suggesting that some bailouts only delayed exit instead of preventing it. The number of failing bailouts could be reduced if European control was tougher. Second, governments’ bailout decisions favored public firms, even though public firms did not outperform private ones in the survival chances. Third, subsidy choice is an endogenous variable in the analysis of the hazard rate. Treating it as exogenous underestimates its impact on the bankruptcy probability. ZUSAMMENFASSUNG - (Die Wirksamkeit von Beihilfe in der EU) Europäische Unternehmen, die in Schwierigkeiten geraten sind, werden regelmäßig von den Regierungen in der EU durch Rettungs- und Restrukturierungsbeihilfen (R&R-Beihilfen) unterstützt. Im vorliegenden Paper werden 86 von der Europäischen Kommission überprüfte Fälle von R&RBeihilfen zwischen 1995 und 2003 herangezogen, um zwei Probleme zu untersuchen: die Auswirkung von R&R-Beihilfen auf die Bankrotthäufigkeit und die bestimmenden Faktoren für Subventionspolitik der Regierungen. Dabei kommt die Studie zu drei Ergebnissen. Es zeigt sich, dass sich die geschätzte Bankrottwahrscheinlichkeit während der ersten vier Jahre nach der Beihilfe erhöht und danach sinkt. Dies deutet darauf hin, dass einige Beihilfen den Marktaustritt nur verzögern, anstatt ihn zu verhindern. Die Zahl der Firmen, die erfolglos Beihilfe bekommen, könnte durch eine strengere europäische Beihilfekontrolle verringert werden. Das zweite Ergebnis besagt, dass die Regierungen bei der Beihilfevergabe staatliche Unternehmen bevorzugt haben, obwohl staatliche Unternehmen gegenüber den privaten keine bessere Überlebenswahrscheinlichkeit haben. Drittens ist die Beihilfewahl eine endogene Variable in der Analyse der Bankrottwahrscheinlichkeit. Sie als exogen zu behandeln bedeutet, ihre Auswirkung auf die Bankrottwahrscheinlichkeit zu unterschätzen.

Suggested Citation

  • Ela Glowicka, 2006. "Effectiveness of Bailouts in the EU," CIG Working Papers SP II 2006-05, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
  • Handle: RePEc:wzb:wzebiv:spii2006-05
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bandopadhyaya, Arindam, 1994. "An Estimation of the Hazard Rate of Firms under Chapter 11 Protection," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 76(2), pages 346-350, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Bortolotti, Bernardo & Cambini, Carlo & Rondi, Laura, 2013. "Reluctant regulation," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 804-828.
    2. European Commission, Directorate-General for Competition (Brussels) (ed.), 2016. "Ex-post evaluation of the impact of restructuring aid decisions on the viability of aided (non-financial) firms: Final report," ZEW Expertises, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research, number 130514.
    3. Heim, Sven & Hüschelrath, Kai & Schmidt-Dengler, Philipp & Strazzeri, Maurizio, 2017. "The impact of state aid on the survival and financial viability of aided firms," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 193-214.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    AState aid; European Union; Discrete-time hazard; Bivariate probit;

    JEL classification:

    • K2 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law
    • G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance
    • L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy

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