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Standortwahl als Franchisingproblem

  • Justus Haucap
  • Christian Wey

Der vorliegende Beitrag interpretiert die Standortentscheidung von Unternehmen als den bschluß eines impliziten Franchisevertrages zwischen dem Standort als Franchisegeber und dem Unternehmen als Franchisenehmer. Standorte bieten ein Bundel von Dienstleistungen wie die Nutzung von Infrastruktur und auch einen Markennamen wie.Made in Germany. an und verlangen dafur eine Nutzungsgebuhr, ublicherweise in Form von Steuern. Anhand von zwei einfachen Modellen wird erortert, warum sich Unternehmen eventuell auch an vordergrundig .teuren. Standorten ansiedeln, wenn Konsumenten Schwierigkeiten haben, die Produktqualitat vor dem Kauf festzustellen. Die Idee ist, daß die Standortwahl - ahnlich wie die Zugehorigkeit zu einer Franchisekette - etwas uber die Produktqualitat eines Unternehmens verrat. Im Gegensatz zur traditionellen Standorttheorie werden damit auch Nachfrageeffekte von Standortkonkurrenz erortert und, darauf aufbauend, argumentiert, daß Standortkonkurrenz nicht unbedingt einen Steuersenkungswettbewerb induzieren muß wie die traditionelle Finanzwissenschaft postuliert. Translation - This paper argues that a firm’s location choice can be viewed as the conclusion of an implicit franchise contract with the location being the franchiser and the firm being the franchisee. Locations offer a basket of services such as infrastructure use as well as a brand name such as "Made in Germany", and they demand a user charge, usually in form of taxes. Two simple models are developed to demonstrate that firms may eventually locate at seemingly expensive locations if consumers have difficulties in determining product quality before purchase. The idea is that location choice tells something about product quality, as does the use of a franchise chain’s brand name. In contrast to traditional location theory, the paper discusses the potential effects location choice may have on product demand, and based on that, it argues that interjurisdictional competition does not necessarily need to induce cut-throat tax competition as traditional public finance theory suggests.

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Paper provided by Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG) in its series CIG Working Papers with number FS IV 99-08.

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Length: 40 pages
Date of creation: Jul 1999
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Jahrbuch für Neue Politische Ökonomie , Vol. 18, 1999, pp. 311-332.
Handle: RePEc:wzb:wzebiv:fsiv99-08
Note: This paper is only available in German!
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  1. Martin, Philippe & Rogers, Carol Ann, 1995. "Industrial location and public infrastructure," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(3-4), pages 335-351, November.
  2. Conrad, Klaus & Seitz, Helmut, 1997. "Infrastructure provision and international market share rivalry," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(6), pages 715-734, November.
  3. Haucap, Justus & Wey, Christian & Barmbold, Jens, 2000. "Location costs, product quality and implicit franchise contracts," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 69-87, October.
  4. Telser, L G, 1980. "A Theory of Self-enforcing Agreements," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 53(1), pages 27-44, January.
  5. Wheeler, David & Mody, Ashoka, 1992. "International investment location decisions : The case of U.S. firms," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(1-2), pages 57-76, August.
  6. Shapiro, Carl, 1983. "Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(4), pages 659-79, November.
  7. Markusen, James R. & Morey, Edward R. & Olewiler, Nancy, 1995. "Competition in regional environmental policies when plant locations are endogenous," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 55-77, January.
  8. WILDASIN, David, . "Nash equilibria in models of fiscal competition," CORE Discussion Papers RP -804, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  9. Klein, Benjamin, 1980. "Transaction Cost Determinants of "Unfair" Contractual Arrangements," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 70(2), pages 356-62, May.
  10. Warren J Bilkey & Erik Nes, 1982. "Country-of-Origin Effects on Product Evaluations," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 13(1), pages 89-100, March.
  11. Romano, Roberta, 1985. "Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 1(2), pages 225-83, Fall.
  12. Justus Haucap & Christian Wey & Jens F. Barmbold, 1997. "Location Choice as a Signal for Product Quality: The Economics of 'Made in Germany'," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 153(3), pages 510-, September.
  13. Francine Lafontaine & Margaret E. Slade, 1998. "Incentive Contracting and the Franchise Decision," NBER Working Papers 6544, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  14. Roberta Romano, 1998. "Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm74, Yale School of Management.
  15. Nelson, Phillip, 1970. "Information and Consumer Behavior," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 78(2), pages 311-29, March-Apr.
  16. Akerlof, George A, 1970. "The Market for 'Lemons': Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500, August.
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