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Standortwahl als Franchisingproblem


  • Justus Haucap
  • Christian Wey


Der vorliegende Beitrag interpretiert die Standortentscheidung von Unternehmen als den bschluß eines impliziten Franchisevertrages zwischen dem Standort als Franchisegeber und dem Unternehmen als Franchisenehmer. Standorte bieten ein Bundel von Dienstleistungen wie die Nutzung von Infrastruktur und auch einen Markennamen wie.Made in Germany. an und verlangen dafur eine Nutzungsgebuhr, ublicherweise in Form von Steuern. Anhand von zwei einfachen Modellen wird erortert, warum sich Unternehmen eventuell auch an vordergrundig .teuren. Standorten ansiedeln, wenn Konsumenten Schwierigkeiten haben, die Produktqualitat vor dem Kauf festzustellen. Die Idee ist, daß die Standortwahl - ahnlich wie die Zugehorigkeit zu einer Franchisekette - etwas uber die Produktqualitat eines Unternehmens verrat. Im Gegensatz zur traditionellen Standorttheorie werden damit auch Nachfrageeffekte von Standortkonkurrenz erortert und, darauf aufbauend, argumentiert, daß Standortkonkurrenz nicht unbedingt einen Steuersenkungswettbewerb induzieren muß wie die traditionelle Finanzwissenschaft postuliert. Translation - This paper argues that a firm’s location choice can be viewed as the conclusion of an implicit franchise contract with the location being the franchiser and the firm being the franchisee. Locations offer a basket of services such as infrastructure use as well as a brand name such as "Made in Germany", and they demand a user charge, usually in form of taxes. Two simple models are developed to demonstrate that firms may eventually locate at seemingly expensive locations if consumers have difficulties in determining product quality before purchase. The idea is that location choice tells something about product quality, as does the use of a franchise chain’s brand name. In contrast to traditional location theory, the paper discusses the potential effects location choice may have on product demand, and based on that, it argues that interjurisdictional competition does not necessarily need to induce cut-throat tax competition as traditional public finance theory suggests.

Suggested Citation

  • Justus Haucap & Christian Wey, 1999. "Standortwahl als Franchisingproblem," CIG Working Papers FS IV 99-08, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
  • Handle: RePEc:wzb:wzebiv:fsiv99-08 Note: This paper is only available in German!

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Haucap, Justus & Wey, Christian & Barmbold, Jens, 2000. "Location costs, product quality and implicit franchise contracts," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 69-87, October.
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    13. Justus Haucap & Christian Wey & Jens F. Barmbold, 1997. "Location Choice as a Signal for Product Quality: The Economics of 'Made in Germany'," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 153(3), pages 510-510, September.
    14. Wheeler, David & Mody, Ashoka, 1992. "International investment location decisions : The case of U.S. firms," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(1-2), pages 57-76, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Haucap, Justus, 2010. "Steuerharmonisierung oder Steuerwettbewerb in Europa?," DICE Ordnungspolitische Perspektiven 09, University of Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).

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