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Coordination, Cooperation, And The Extended Coasean Approach To Economic Policy


  • Alberto Chilosi

    (University of Pisa)


The Coasean way to deal with the cooperation failure that is implicit in Pareto inefficiency is to remove or lessen the obstacles to cooperation through the attribution of property rights and the elimination or reduction of transaction costs. The relevance of this approach is however undermined by some intrinsic difficulties to its application in a real world context, such as those arising from the number and indeterminacy of the interested parties, as well as from the free rider problem. A way to extend the Coasean approach taking into account those real life limitations is to consider the local authorities as representatives of the interest of their local constituencies and, through the provision of an adequate institutional framework, to enhance the opportunities for cooperation through voluntary agreements involving private and public parties. Thus the extent of cooperation could be widened, as opposite to traditional remedial actions relying on non- contractual, or direct entrepreneurial action by the state. With the reduction in the appeal of direct and coercive action by the state a number of institutions emphasising the contractual cooperation between public and private parties have effectively grown of importance, as wide apart as the township and village enterprises in China, or the "programmazione negoziata" in Italy. In the final part of the paper the latter

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  • Alberto Chilosi, 2003. "Coordination, Cooperation, And The Extended Coasean Approach To Economic Policy," Public Economics 0306003, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 09 Sep 2003.
  • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0306003
    Note: Type of Document - Acrobat pdf; prepared on windows xp; to print on A4; pages: 26; figures: none

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Matei, Ani & Dogaru, Tatiana-Camelia, 2012. "Coordination of Public Policies through Strategic Planning Instruments: Romania Case study," MPRA Paper 53674, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Jan 2014.
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    4. Lozano, Rodrigo & Carpenter, Angela & Lozano, Francisco J., 2014. "Critical reflections on the Chemical Leasing concept," Resources, Conservation & Recycling, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 53-60.
    5. Lozano, Rodrigo & Carpenter, Angela & Satric, Vojislavka, 2013. "Fostering green chemistry through a collaborative business model: A Chemical Leasing case study from Serbia," Resources, Conservation & Recycling, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 136-144.

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    More about this item


    coase theorem; economic policy; transition; property rights; cooperation; coordination;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K0 - Law and Economics - - General
    • H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • P21 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Systems and Transition Economies - - - Planning, Coordination, and Reform

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