The Agency Problem in New Institutional Economics
The aim of the paper is to set the agency problem into a broad context of New Institutional Economics with an emphasis on historical connections. In the first section, I explain the historical evolution of basic theoretical concepts like the theory of firm, the theory of market process and the theory of property rights. The second section is dedicated to the explanation of the general concept of agency problem extended with the problem of asymmetric information leading to adverse selection and the problem of moral hazard, in context of previous historical connections. In the last section, the author provides some suggestions for the further theoretical and empirical research.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 2009 (2009)
Issue (Month): 5 ()
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: (02) 24 09 51 11
Fax: (02) 24 22 06 57
Web page: http://www.vse.cz/
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:|| Postal: Redakce Politické ekonomie, Vysoká škola ekonomická, nám. W. Churchilla 4, 130 67 Praha 3|
Web: http://www.vse.cz/polek/ Email:
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1994. "Politicians and Firms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 109(4), pages 995-1025, November.
- North, Douglass C, 1994.
"Economic Performance through Time,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 359-68, June.
- J. Kornai & E. Maskin & G. Roland., 2004.
"Understanding the Soft Budget Constraint,"
N.P. Redaktsiya zhurnala "Voprosy Economiki", vol. 12.
- J. Kornai & E. Maskin & G. Roland., 2004. "Understanding the Soft Budget Constraint," VOPROSY ECONOMIKI, N.P. Redaktsiya zhurnala "Voprosy Economiki", vol. 11.
- J�nos Kornai & Eric Maskin & G�rard Roland, 2003. "Understanding the Soft Budget Constraint," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(4), pages 1095-1136, December.
- Peter Leeson, 2007. "Efficient anarchy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 130(1), pages 41-53, January.
- Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Separation of Ownership and Control," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 301-25, June.
- Langlois, Richard N & Cosgel, Metin M, 1993. "Frank Knight on Risk, Uncertainty, and the Firm: A New Interpretation," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 31(3), pages 456-65, July.
- Israel Kirzner, 1998. "Coordination as a Criterion for Economic “Goodness”," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 9(4), pages 289-301, December.
- Williamson, Oliver E, 1971. "The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 61(2), pages 112-23, May.
- Demsetz, Harold, 1988. "The Theory of the Firm Revisited," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(1), pages 141-61, Spring.
- Coase, Ronald, 1998. "The New Institutional Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(2), pages 72-74, May.
- Joseph M. Ostroy & Louis Makowski, 2001. "Perfect Competition and the Creativity of the Market," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 39(2), pages 479-535, June.
- Fama, Eugene F, 1980. "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(2), pages 288-307, April.
- Knight, Frank H, 1942. "Profit and Entrepreneurial Functions," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 2(S1), pages 126-132, December.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:prg:jnlpol:v:2009:y:2009:i:5:id:704:p:677-695. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Vaclav Subrta)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.