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Incentivi fiscali e politiche di sviluppo economico regionale in Europa

Author

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  • Beniamino Moro

    (Università degli Studi di Cagliari, Dipartimento di Economia)

Abstract

The paper shows that fiscal policy and tax incentives are more effective than monetary policy and monetary incentives in supporting a regional development policy among European regions. Anyway, only recently the EU Commission agreed that member countries can use tax incentives instead of monetary ones to support new investment in European less developed areas, but she still does not permit that a member state can apply a differentiated fiscal policy on a regional basis. In fact, according to the Commission, a reduced tax rate for growth purposes in European less developed areas has the same effect as a working aid for those firms located in these areas, which is forbidden by the Code of conduct that regulates fiscal competition among member states. The paper shows this interpretation is not correct and also demonstrates that a regional fiscal policy differentiated among areas inside the same member state can be supported without violate the sound principles of fiscal free competition incorporated in the Code of Conduct.

Suggested Citation

  • Beniamino Moro, 2001. "Incentivi fiscali e politiche di sviluppo economico regionale in Europa," Moneta e Credito, Economia civile, vol. 54(215), pages 343-388.
    • Handle: RePEc:psl:moneta:2001:33
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    File URL: http://ojs.uniroma1.it/index.php/monetaecredito/article/view/9778/9663
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Richard A. Musgrave, 1961. "Approaches to a Fiscal Theory of Political Federalism," NBER Chapters, in: Public Finances: Needs, Sources, and Utilization, pages 97-134, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Brennan,Geoffrey & Buchanan,James M., 2006. "The Power to Tax," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521027922.
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    Cited by:

    1. Alberto Chilosi, 2003. "Coordination, Cooperation, And The Extended Coasean Approach To Economic Policy," Public Economics 0306003, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 09 Sep 2003.
    2. Padoa Schioppa, Fiorella Kostoris & Basile, Roberto, 2002. "Unemployment Dynamics of the 'Mezzogiornos of Europe': Lessons for the Mezzogiorno of Italy," CEPR Discussion Papers 3594, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Fiscal Policy; Policy; Regional Development; Regional; Tax;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
    • R58 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis - - - Regional Development Planning and Policy

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