Collusion and Commitment in Bank Bailout
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More about this item
Keywordssoft budget constraint; collusion; moral hazard; commitment; transition; centralized economy.;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
- H72 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Budget and Expenditures
- L23 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Organization of Production
- P31 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Socialist Enterprises and Their Transitions
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-10-04 (All new papers)
- NEP-FIN-2005-10-04 (Finance)
- NEP-FMK-2005-10-04 (Financial Markets)
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