Do bilateral investment treaties increase foreign direct investment to developing countries?
Foreign investors are often skeptical toward the quality of the domestic institutions and the enforceability of the law in developing countries. Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) guarantee certain standards of treatment that can be enforced via binding investor-to- state dispute settlement outside the domestic juridical system. Developing countries accept restrictions on their sovereignty in the hope that the protection from political and other risks leads to an increase in foreign direct investment (FDI), which is also the stated purpose of BITs. We provide the first rigorous quantitative evidence that a higher number of BITs raises the FDI that flows to a developing country. This result is very robust to changes in model specification, estimation technique and sample size. There is also some limited evidence that BITs might function as substitutes for good domestic institutional quality, but this result is not robust to different specifications of institutional quality.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Noorbakhsh, Farhad & Paloni, Alberto & Youssef, Ali, 2001. "Human Capital and FDI Inflows to Developing Countries: New Empirical Evidence," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 29(9), pages 1593-1610, September.
- Alesina, Alberto & Perotti, Roberto, 1996.
"Income distribution, political instability, and investment,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 40(6), pages 1203-1228, June.
- Alberto Alesina & Roberto Perotti, 1993. "Income Distribution, Political Instability, and Investment," NBER Working Papers 4486, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Braumoeller, Bear F., 2004. "Hypothesis Testing and Multiplicative Interaction Terms," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 58(04), pages 807-820, October.
- Michael S Minor, 1994. "The Demise of Expropriation as an Instrument of LDC Policy 1980-1992," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 25(1), pages 177-188, March.
- Christopher T. Taylor, 2000. "The Impact of Host Country Government Policy on US Multinational Investment Decisions," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(5), pages 635-647, 05.
- Chakrabarti, Avik, 2001. "The Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment: Sensitivity Analyses of Cross-Country Regressions," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(1), pages 89-113.
- Schneider, Friedrich & Frey, Bruno S., 1985. "Economic and political determinants of foreign direct investment," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 161-175, February.
- Mary Hallward-Driemeier, 2003. "Do bilateral investment treaties attract foreign direct investment? Only a bit - and they could bite," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3121, The World Bank.
- W. J. Henisz, 2000. "The Institutional Environment for Economic Growth," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(1), pages 1-31, 03.
- Globerman, Steven & Shapiro, Daniel, 2002. "Global Foreign Direct Investment Flows: The Role of Governance Infrastructure," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 30(11), pages 1899-1919, November.
- Wheeler, David & Mody, Ashoka, 1992. "International investment location decisions : The case of U.S. firms," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(1-2), pages 57-76, August.
- Harm Zebregs, 1998. "Can the Neoclassical Model Explain the Distribution of Foreign Direct Investment Across Developing Countries?," IMF Working Papers 98/139, International Monetary Fund.
- Jennifer Tobin & Susan Rose-Ackerman, 2003. "Foreign Direct Investment and the Business Environment in Developing Countries: the Impact of Bilateral Investment Treaties," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 587, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
- Perotti, Roberto & Alesina, Alberto, 1996. "Income Distribution, Political Instability, and Investment," Scholarly Articles 4553018, Harvard University Department of Economics.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpif:0411004. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (EconWPA)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.