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A sufficient condition for all-or-nothing information supply in price discrimination

Author

Listed:
  • Marco LiCalzi

    (University of Venice, Italy)

Abstract

This paper provides a sufficient condition under which the optimal policy of a monopolistic seller who is considering the tradeoff between price discrimination and information disclosure is at one of two extremes: either buyers are given access to all the available information, or the seller makes no disclosure at all.

Suggested Citation

  • Marco LiCalzi, 2005. "A sufficient condition for all-or-nothing information supply in price discrimination," Game Theory and Information 0510005, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0510005
    Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 15. Appeared in: Rendiconti per gli Studi Economici e Quantitativi, 2005, 163–177.
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    File URL: https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/game/papers/0510/0510005.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Moscarini, Giuseppe & Ottaviani, Marco, 2001. "Price Competition for an Informed Buyer," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 101(2), pages 457-493, December.
    2. Lewis, Tracy R & Sappington, David E M, 1994. "Supplying Information to Facilitate Price Discrimination," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 35(2), pages 309-327, May.
    3. Milgrom, Paul & Shannon, Chris, 1994. "Monotone Comparative Statics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(1), pages 157-180, January.
    4. Takemi Yanagimoto & Masashi Okamoto, 1969. "Partial orderings of permutations and monotonicity of a rank correlation statistic," Annals of the Institute of Statistical Mathematics, Springer;The Institute of Statistical Mathematics, vol. 21(1), pages 489-506, December.
    5. Justin P. Johnson & David P. Myatt, 2006. "On the Simple Economics of Advertising, Marketing, and Product Design," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(3), pages 756-784, June.
    6. Nicola Persico, 2000. "Information Acquisition in Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(1), pages 135-148, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Juan-José Ganuza & José S. Penalva, 2005. "On Information and Competition in Private Value Auctions," Working Papers 158, Barcelona School of Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Comparative statics; supermodular functions; lattice programming.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

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