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Anonymous Banking and Financial Repression: How Does China's Reform Limit Government Predation without Reducing Its Revenue?

Author

Listed:
  • Chong-En Bai
  • David D. Li
  • Yingyi Qian
  • Yijiang Wang

Abstract

May 31, 1999 China's economic performance of the past two decades presents a puzzle for the economics of transition and development: Enormous private business incentives were unleashed that have fueled rapid economic growth despite the fact that China has had very weak "conventional institutions" (such as the rule of law and separation of powers) to constrain the government from arbitrary intrusion into economic activities. We argue that one mechanism that has limited the government's ability for predation and harassment is commitment through information decentralization, where the key institution is "anonymous banking," that is, a combination of the use of cash for transactions and the use of anonymous savings deposits. Meanwhile, the government has benefitted from the improved private incentives by collecting quasi-fiscal revenues from the state banking system through "financial repression," a combination of controls on international capital flows with restrictions on domestic interest rates. We show that the major features of China's economy concerning its fiscal decline, financial deepening, and the sectoral dual-track can be better understood using this analytical framework.

Suggested Citation

  • Chong-En Bai & David D. Li & Yingyi Qian & Yijiang Wang, 1999. "Anonymous Banking and Financial Repression: How Does China's Reform Limit Government Predation without Reducing Its Revenue?," Working Papers 99014, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:wop:stanec:99014
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Yingyi Qian, 2002. "How Reform Worked in China," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 473, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
    2. Yang, Xiaokai, 2001. "China's entry to the WTO," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 11(4), pages 437-442.
    3. Jeffrey Sachs & Wing Thye Woo & Xiaokai Yang, 2000. "Economic Reforms and Constitutional Transition," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 1(2), pages 423-479, November.
    4. Полтерович В.М., 2006. "Стратегии Институциональных Реформ. Китай И Россия," Журнал Экономика и математические методы (ЭММ), Центральный Экономико-Математический Институт (ЦЭМИ), vol. 42(2), апрель.
    5. Ma, Debin & Rubin, Jared, 2019. "The Paradox of Power: Principal-agent problems and administrative capacity in Imperial China (and other absolutist regimes)," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 277-294.
    6. Roland, Gerard & Verdier, Thierry, 2003. "Law enforcement and transition," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(4), pages 669-685, August.
    7. Ahrens, Joachim & Jünemann, Patrick, 2010. "Transitional institutions, institutional complementarities and economic performance in China: A 'Varieties of Capitalism' approach," Discourses in Social Market Economy 2010-11, OrdnungsPolitisches Portal (OPO).
    8. Jared Rubin & Debin Ma, 2017. "The Paradox of Power: Understanding Fiscal Capacity in Imperial China and Absolutist Regimes," Working Papers 17-02, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
    9. Huang, Yasheng, 2005. "Ownership biases and FDI in China: two provinces," Working papers 4537-04, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
    10. Qian, Yingyi, 2002. "How Reform Worked in China," CEPR Discussion Papers 3447, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    11. Yingyi Qian, 1999. "The Institutional Foundations of China's Market Transition," Working Papers 99011, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
    12. Eckaus, R. S., 2003. "Some consequences of fiscal reliance on extrabudgetary revenues in China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 72-88.
    13. Mingxing Liu & Ran Tao & Fei Yuan & Guangzhong Cao, 2008. "Instrumental land use investment-driven growth in China," Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 13(3), pages 313-331.
    14. Yao, Yang & Yueh, Linda, 2009. "Law, Finance, and Economic Growth in China: An Introduction," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 37(4), pages 753-762, April.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • O16 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment; Corporate Finance and Governance
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
    • P26 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Property Rights

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