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How Reform Worked in China

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  • Yingyi Qian

Abstract

China's reform worked and produced one of the most impressive growth in the largest developing and transition economy in the world in the past twenty-two years. That China has managed to grow so rapidly despite the absence of many conventional institutions such as rule of law and secure private property rights is puzzling. To understand how reform works in a developing and transition economy that has great growth potential, it is not enough to study the conventional "best-practice institutions" as a desirable goal. One should also study how feasible, imperfect institutions have evolved to complement the initial conditions and to function as stepping stones in the transition toward the goal. Underlying China's reform is a serial of institutional changes concerning the market, firms, and the government in the novel form of "transitional institutions." These institutions succeed when they achieve two objectives at the same time: to improve economic efficiency by unleashing the standard forces of incentives and competition on the one hand, and to make the reform a win-win game and thus interest compatible for those in power on the other.

Suggested Citation

  • Yingyi Qian, 2002. "How Reform Worked in China," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 473, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
  • Handle: RePEc:wdi:papers:2002-473
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    4. Chari, Murali D.R. & Banalieva, Elitsa R., 2015. "How do pro-market reforms impact firm profitability? The case of India under reform," Journal of World Business, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 357-367.
    5. Shuxing Shi & Kunming Huang & Dezhu Ye & Linhui Yu, 2014. "Culture and regional economic development: Evidence from China," Papers in Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 93(2), pages 281-299, June.
    6. Eggleston, Karen & Wang, Jian & Rao, Keqin, 2008. "From plan to market in the health sector?: China's experience," Journal of Asian Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(5-6), pages 400-412.
    7. repec:ces:ifodic:v:2:y:2004:i:2:p:14567799 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Jiandang Liu & Jie Tang & Bo Zhou & Zhijun Liang, 2018. "The Effect of Governance Quality on Economic Growth: Based on China’s Provincial Panel Data," Economies, MDPI, vol. 6(4), pages 1-23, October.
    9. Gérard Roland, 2004. "Institutions and Economic Performance - Fast-moving and Slow-moving Institutions," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 2(02), pages 16-21, October.
    10. Yiu Por (Vincent) Chen, 2016. "Fiscal Decentralization, Rural Industrialization and Undocumented Labour Mobility in Rural China, 1982–87," Regional Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 50(9), pages 1469-1482, September.
    11. Marcelo de Paiva Abreu, 2005. "China´s emergence in the global economy and Brazil," Textos para discussão 491, Department of Economics PUC-Rio (Brazil).
    12. Zheng, Yu & Jiang, Helu & Zhu, Lijun, 2022. "Entry Barriers and Growth: The Role of Endogenous Market Structure," CEPR Discussion Papers 15763, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    13. Wang, Yuanyuan & You, Jing, 2012. "Corruption and firm growth: Evidence from China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 415-433.
    14. Bruno Meessen & Gerald Bloom, 2007. "Economic Transition, Institutional Changes and the Health System: Some Lessons from Rural China," Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 10(3), pages 209-231.
    15. Bingzheng Chen & Sharon Tennyson & Maoqi Wang & Haizhen Zhou, 2014. "The Development and Regulation of China's Insurance Market: History and Perspectives," Risk Management and Insurance Review, American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 17(2), pages 241-263, September.
    16. Rodríguez-Pose, Andrés & Hardy, Daniel, 2017. "Firm competitiveness and regional disparities in Georgia," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 67543, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    17. Bruno Meessen & Gerald Bloom, 2007. "Economic Transition, Institutional Changes and the Health System: Some Lessons from Rural China," Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 10(3), pages 209-231.
    18. Xiaozu Wang, 2011. "Understanding China’s Role in the Post-financial Crisis World," Chapters, in: Carlo Secchi & Antonio Villafranca (ed.), Global Governance and the Role of the EU, chapter 3, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    19. Alice Nicole Sindzingre, 2011. "The Conditions for Long-Term Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa: China as a Model, a Contraint and an Opportunity," Post-Print halshs-03604139, HAL.
    20. Gérard Roland, 2004. "Institutions and Economic Performance - Fast-moving and Slow-moving Institutions," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 2(2), pages 16-21, October.
    21. Krug, B., 2006. "Enterprise Ground Zero in China," ERIM Report Series Research in Management ERS-2006-024-ORG, Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus University Rotterdam.
    22. Ramanujam Nandini & Caivano Nicholas, 2016. "The BRIC Nations and the Anatomy of Economic Development: The Core Tenets of Rule of Law," The Law and Development Review, De Gruyter, vol. 9(2), pages 269-320, December.
    23. Giovanni Dosi & Jiasu Lei & Xiaodan Yu, 2013. "Institutional Change and Productivity Growth in China's Manufacturing 1998-2007: the Microeconomics of Creative Restructuring," LEM Papers Series 2013/07, Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM), Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy.
    24. Helu Jiang & Yu Zheng & Lijun Zhu, 2023. "Entry Barriers and Growth: The Role of Endogenous Market Structure," Working Papers 956, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
    25. Mustaq H. Khan, 2003. "L'échec de l'État dans les pays en développement et les stratégies de réforme institutionnelle," Revue d’économie du développement, De Boeck Université, vol. 11(2), pages 5-48.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    China; institution; reform; transition;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • P20 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - General
    • P26 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Property Rights

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