Limiting Government Predation through Anonymous Banking: A Theory and Evidence from China
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- Miyamoto, Katsuhiro & Yu, Jinping, 2000. "Macroeconomic Policy and Ownership Structure in a Mixed Transition Economy," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 762-785, December.
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