Crime Distribution & Victim Behavior During a Crime Wave
The study of how crime affects different income groups faces several difficulties. The first is that crime-avoiding activities vary across income groups. Thus, a lower victimization rate in one group may not reflect a lower burden of crime, but rather a higher investment in avoiding crime. A second difficulty is that, typically, only a small fraction of the population is victimized so that empirical tests often lack the statistical power to detect differences across groups. We take advantage of a dramatic increase in crime rates in Argentina during the late 1990s to document several interesting patterns. First, the increase in victimization experienced by the poor is larger than the increase endured by the rich. The difference appears large: low-income people have experienced increases in victimization rates that are almost 50 percent higher than those suffered by high-income people. Second, for home robberies, where the rich can protect themselves (by hiring private security, for example), we find significantly larger increases in victimization rates amongst the poor. In contrast, for robberies on the street, where the rich can only mimic the poor, we find similar increases in victimization for both income groups. Third, we document direct evidence on pecuniary and non-pecuniary protection activities by both the rich and poor, ranging from the avoidance of dark places to the hiring of private security. Fourth, we show the correlations between changes in protection and mimicking and changes in crime victimization. Fifth, we offer one possible way of using these estimates to explain the incidence of crime across income groups.
|Date of creation:||01 Nov 2006|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: 734 763-5020
Fax: 734 763-5850
Web page: http://www.wdi.umich.edu
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Victor Lavy, 2002. "Evaluating the Effect of Teachers' Group Performance Incentives on Pupil Achievement," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(6), pages 1286-1317, December.
- Edward L. Glaeser & Bruce Sacerdote, 1996.
"Why is There More Crime in Cities?,"
Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers
1746, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Richard B. Freeman, 1996.
"Why Do So Many Young American Men Commit Crimes and What Might We Do about It?,"
Journal of Economic Perspectives,
American Economic Association, vol. 10(1), pages 25-42, Winter.
- Richard B. Freeman, 1996. "Why Do So Many Young American Men Commit Crimes and What Might We Do About It?," NBER Working Papers 5451, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Gary S. Becker, 1968.
"Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 76, pages 169.
- Rafael Di Tella & Ernesto Schargrodsky, 2004. "Do Police Reduce Crime? Estimates Using the Allocation of Police Forces After a Terrorist Attack," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(1), pages 115-133, March.
- Ehrlich, Isaac, 1973. "Participation in Illegitimate Activities: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(3), pages 521-65, May-June.
- Mark Duggan, 2001.
"More Guns, More Crime,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(5), pages 1086-1114, October.
- Gaviria, Alejandro & Pages, Carmen, 2002. "Patterns of crime victimization in Latin American cities," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 181-203, February.
- Pedro Dal BÃ³ & Ernesto Dal BÃ³, 2004.
"Workers, Warriors and Criminals: Social Conflict in General Equilibrium,"
Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings
642, Econometric Society.
- Ernesto Dal Bó & Pedro Dal Bó, 2011. "Workers, Warriors, And Criminals: Social Conflict In General Equilibrium," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 9(4), pages 646-677, 08.
- Pedro DalBo & Ernesto DalBo, 2004. "Workers, Warriors and Criminals: Social Conflict in General Equilibrium," Working Papers 2004-11, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Pedro Dal bÃ³, 2004. "Workers, Warriors and Criminals: Social Conflict in General Equilibrium," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 341, Econometric Society.
- Steven D. Levitt, 1999. "The changing relationship between income and crime victimization," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Sep, pages 87-98.
- Galiani, Sebastian & Gertler, Paul & Schargrodsky, Ernesto, 2008. "School decentralization: Helping the good get better, but leaving the poor behind," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(10-11), pages 2106-2120, October.
- Steven Shavell, 1990. "Individual Precautions to Prevent Theft: Private Versus Socially OptimalBehavior," NBER Working Papers 3560, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Norman Loayza & Pablo Fajnzylber & Daniel Lederman, 2000. "Crime and Victimization: An Economic Perspective," JOURNAL OF LACEA ECONOMIA, LACEA - LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION.
- Lott, John R, Jr & Mustard, David B, 1997. "Crime, Deterrence, and Right-to-Carry Concealed Handguns," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(1), pages 1-68, January.
- Papps, Kerry L. & Winkelmann, Rainer, 1998. "Unemployment and Crime: New Answers to an Old Question," IZA Discussion Papers 25, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Witte, Ann Dryden, 1980. "Estimating the Economic Model of Crime with Individual Data," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 94(1), pages 57-84, February.
- Julie Berry Cullen & Steven D. Levitt, 1996.
"Crime, Urban Flight, and the Consequences for Cities,"
NBER Working Papers
5737, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Julie Berry Cullen & Steven D. Levitt, 1999. "Crime, Urban Flight, And The Consequences For Cities," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 81(2), pages 159-169, May.
- H. Naci Mocan & Stephen C. Billups & Jody Overland, 2005.
"A Dynamic Model of Differential Human Capital and Criminal Activity,"
London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 72(288), pages 655-681, November.
- H. Naci Mocan & Stephen C. Billups & Jody Overland, 2000. "A Dynamic Model of Differential Human Capital and Criminal Activity," NBER Working Papers 7584, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Ian Ayres & Steven D. Levitt, 1998.
"Measuring Positive Externalities From Unobservable Victim Precaution: An Empirical Analysis Of Lojack,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
MIT Press, vol. 113(1), pages 43-77, February.
- Ian Ayres & Steven D. Levitt, 1997. "Measuring Positive Externalities from Unobservable Victim Precaution: An Empirical Analysis of Lojack," NBER Working Papers 5928, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Fajnzylber, Pablo & Lederman, Daniel & Loayza, Norman, 2002. "Inequality and Violent Crime," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 45(1), pages 1-40, April.
- Soares, Rodrigo R., 2004. "Development, crime and punishment: accounting for the international differences in crime rates," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 155-184, February.
- Kerry Papps & Rainer Winkelmann, 2000. "Unemployment and crime: New evidence for an old question," New Zealand Economic Papers, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 34(1), pages 53-71.
- Tauchen, Helen & Witte, Ann Dryden & Griesinger, Harriet, 1994. "Criminal Deterrence: Revisiting the Issue with a Birth Cohort," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 76(3), pages 399-412, August.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wdi:papers:2006-849. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Laurie Gendron)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.