Conscription and Crime
The initiation in criminal activities is, typically, a young phenomenon. The study of the determinants of entry into criminal activities should pay attention to major events affecting youth. In many countries, one of these important events is mandatory participation in military service. The objective of this study is to estimate the causal relationship between mandatory participation in military service and crime. The authors exploit the random assignment through a draft lottery of young men to conscription in Argentina to identify this causal effect. Their results suggest that participation in military service increased the likelihood of developing a criminal record in adulthood (in particular, for property and weapon-related crimes).
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- Angrist, Joshua & Krueger, Alan B, 1994.
"Why Do World War II Veterans Earn More Than Nonveterans?,"
Journal of Labor Economics,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 12(1), pages 74-97, January.
- Joshua Angrist & Alan B. Krueger, 1989. "Why Do World War II Veterans Earn More Than Nonveterans?," Working Papers 634, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
- Alan B. Krueger & Joshua D. Angrist, 1989. "Why do World War II Veterans Earn More Than Nonveterans?," NBER Working Papers 2991, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Casey B. Mulligan, 2005.
"Conscription as Regulation,"
American Law and Economics Review,
Oxford University Press, vol. 7(1), pages 85-111.
- Mulligan, C. B. & Shleifer, Andrei, 2005. "Conscription as Regulation," Scholarly Articles 27867136, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Casey Mulligan & Andrei Shleifer, 2004. "Conscription as Regulation," NBER Working Papers 10558, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Casey Mulligan & Andrei Shleifer, "undated". "Conscription as Regulation," Working Paper 19486, Harvard University OpenScholar.
- Joshua D. Angrist, 1989.
"Lifetime Earnings and the Vietnam Era Draft Lottery: Evidence from Social Security Administrative Records,"
631, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
- Angrist, Joshua D, 1990. "Lifetime Earnings and the Vietnam Era Draft Lottery: Evidence from Social Security Administrative Records," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(3), pages 313-336, June.
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