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Balancing Regulations to Promote Jobs

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  • Arvo Kuddo
  • David Robalino
  • Michael Weber

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Arvo Kuddo & David Robalino & Michael Weber, 2015. "Balancing Regulations to Promote Jobs," World Bank Publications - Reports 23324, The World Bank Group.
    • Handle: RePEc:wbk:wboper:23324
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Raj Chetty, 2004. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance When Income Effects are Large," NBER Working Papers 10500, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Lalive, Rafael, 2008. "How do extended benefits affect unemployment duration A regression discontinuity approach," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 142(2), pages 785-806, February.
    3. Helena Ribe & David A. Robalino & Ian Walker, 2012. "From Right to Reality : Incentives, Labor Markets, and the Challenge of Universal Social Protection in Latin America and the Caribbean [De los derechos a la realidad : incentivos, mercados de trabajo, y el desafío de la portección social universal," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 6008, October.
    4. Raj Chetty, 2008. "Moral Hazard versus Liquidity and Optimal Unemployment Insurance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 116(2), pages 173-234, April.
    5. Paula Nagler, 2013. "How unemployment insurance savings accounts affect employment duration: evidence from Chile," IZA Journal of Labor & Development, Springer;Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit GmbH (IZA), vol. 2(1), pages 1-25, December.
    6. Adriana D. Kugler & Gilles Saint-Paul, 2004. "How Do Firing Costs Affect Worker Flows in a World with Adverse Selection?," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(3), pages 553-584, July.
    7. John Addison & Paulino Teixeira, 2005. "What Have We Learned about the Employment Effects of Severance Pay? Further Iterations of Lazear Et al," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 32(3), pages 345-368, September.
    8. Chetty, Raj & Looney, Adam, 2006. "Consumption smoothing and the welfare consequences of social insurance in developing economies," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(12), pages 2351-2356, December.
    9. Abidoye, Babatunde & Orazem, Peter & Vodopivec, Milan, 2008. "Firing Cost and Firm Size: A Study of Sri Lanka's Severance Pay System," Staff General Research Papers Archive 12922, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    10. Friesen, Jane, 2005. "Statutory firing costs and lay-offs in Canada," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 147-168, April.
    11. Danielle Venn, 2012. "Eligibility Criteria for Unemployment Benefits: Quantitative Indicators for OECD and EU Countries," OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers 131, OECD Publishing.
    12. Milan Vodopivec, 2004. "Income Support for the Unemployed : Issues and Options," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 14922, October.
    13. Julián Messina & Giovanna Vallanti, 2007. "Job Flow Dynamics and Firing Restrictions: Evidence from Europe," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(521), pages 279-301, June.
    14. Bosch, Mariano & Esteban-Pretel, Julen, 2015. "The labor market effects of introducing unemployment benefits in an economy with high informality," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 1-17.
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    Cited by:

    1. Romain Duval & Prakash Loungani, 2021. "Designing Labor Market Institutions in Emerging Market and Developing Economies: A Review of Evidence and IMF Policy Advice," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Association for Comparative Economic Studies, vol. 63(1), pages 31-83, March.

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