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Unemployment Compensation During the Great Recession: Theory and Evidence

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  • Walter Nicholson
  • Karen Needels
  • Heinrich Hock

Abstract

The extreme labor market weakness during and after the Great Recession led to the passage of extensive federal legislation related to unemployment compensation. In this paper, we summarize that legislation and some of the research related to it. Although our particular focus is on the very long potential durations of benefits (up to 99 weeks) initially implemented in 2008–2009, we also look at a variety of other initiatives. Most of the research we review comes from the United States. But we also provide a brief look at the vast European literature that addresses many of the same policy issues.

Suggested Citation

  • Walter Nicholson & Karen Needels & Heinrich Hock, 2014. "Unemployment Compensation During the Great Recession: Theory and Evidence," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 67(1), pages 187-218, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:ntj:journl:v:67:y:2014:i:1:p:187-218
    DOI: 10.17310/ntj.2014.1.06
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    Cited by:

    1. Mathias Dolls & Clemens Fuest & Dirk Neumann & Andreas Peichl, 2018. "An unemployment insurance scheme for the euro area? A comparison of different alternatives using microdata," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 25(1), pages 273-309, February.
    2. Wang, Cheng & Williamson, Stephen D., 2002. "Moral hazard, optimal unemployment insurance, and experience rating," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(7), pages 1337-1371, October.
    3. Wang, Cheng & Williamson, Stephen, 1996. "Unemployment insurance with moral hazard in a dynamic economy," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 1-41, June.
    4. repec:ces:ifodic:v:14:y:2016:i:1:p:19204335 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Mathias Dolls & Clemens Fuest & Dirk Neumann & Andreas Peichl, 2016. "A Basic Unemployment Insurance Scheme for the Euro Area," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 14(1), pages 55-60, 05.
    6. De-Chih Liu, 2023. "Unemployment persistence with an evolutionary perspective: job creation or destruction (or both)?," Evolutionary and Institutional Economics Review, Springer, vol. 20(1), pages 83-109, April.
    7. Francesco Spadafora, 2022. "Don’t let me down: unemployment insurance in the United States," Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers) 673, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    8. Mathias Dolls & Clemens Fuest & Dirk Neumann & Andreas Peichl, 2016. "A Basic Unemployment Insurance Scheme for the Euro Area," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 14(01), pages 55-60, May.
    9. Heinrich Hock & Walter Nicholson & Karen Needels & Joanne Lee & Priyanka Anand, "undated". "Additional Unemployment Compensation Benefits During the Great Recession: Recipients and Their Post-Claim Outcomes," Mathematica Policy Research Reports 881bfec473cb45498e8392657, Mathematica Policy Research.

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