Can Firms with Political Connections Borrow More Than Those Without? Evidence from Firm-Level Data for Indonesia
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- Fu, Jiangtao & Shimamoto, Daichi & Todo, Yasuyuki, 2017. "Can firms with political connections borrow more than those without? Evidence from firm-level data for Indonesia," Journal of Asian Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 45-55.
- FU Jiangtao & SHIMAMOTO Daichi & TODO Yasuyuki, 2015. "Can Firms with Political Connections Borrow More Than Those Without? Evidence from firm-level data for Indonesia," Discussion papers 15087, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- ZHANG Hongyong, 2017. "Political Connections and Antidumping Investigations: Evidence from China," Discussion papers 17092, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
More about this item
KeywordsPolitical Connections; Credit Constraints; Small and Medium Enterprises; Indonesia;
- G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
- L53 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Enterprise Policy
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