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Economic Theories of Settlement Bargaining

  • Andrew F. Daughety

    ()

    (Department of Economics and Law School, Vanderbilt University)

  • Jennifer F. Reinganum

    ()

    (Department of Economics and Law School, Vanderbilt University)

We briefly review two basic models of settlement bargaining based on concepts from information economics and game theory. We then discuss how these models have been generalized to address issues that arise when there are more than two litigants with related cases. Linkages between cases can arise due to exogenous factors such as correlated culpability or damages, or they can be generated by discretionary choices on the part of the litigants themselves or by legal doctrine and rules of procedure.

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File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/VUECON/vu05-w08.pdf
File Function: First version, 2005
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Vanderbilt University Department of Economics in its series Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers with number 0508.

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Date of creation: Apr 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:van:wpaper:0508
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.vanderbilt.edu/econ/wparchive/index.html

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  1. Spier, Kathryn E, 2003. " The Use of "Most-Favored-Nation" Clauses in Settlement of Litigation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(1), pages 78-95, Spring.
  2. Feessa, Eberhard & Muehlheusser, Gerd, 2000. "Settling multidefendant lawsuits under incomplete information," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 295-313, June.
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