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Economic Theories of Settlement Bargaining

Author Info

Listed author(s):
  • Andrew F. Daughety

    ()

    (Department of Economics and Law School, Vanderbilt University)

  • Jennifer F. Reinganum

    ()

    (Department of Economics and Law School, Vanderbilt University)

Abstract

We briefly review two basic models of settlement bargaining based on concepts from information economics and game theory. We then discuss how these models have been generalized to address issues that arise when there are more than two litigants with related cases. Linkages between cases can arise due to exogenous factors such as correlated culpability or damages, or they can be generated by discretionary choices on the part of the litigants themselves or by legal doctrine and rules of procedure.

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File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/VUECON/vu05-w08.pdf
File Function: First version, 2005
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Vanderbilt University Department of Economics in its series Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers with number 0508.

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Date of creation: Apr 2005
Handle: RePEc:van:wpaper:0508
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.vanderbilt.edu/econ/wparchive/index.html

Keywords: Multiple litigants; externalities; asymmetric information;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

  • K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
  • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
  • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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  1. Kathryn E. Spier, 2003. "“Tied to the Mast†: Most-Favored-Nation Clauses in Settlement Contracts," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 32(1), pages 91-120, 01.
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Cited by:

  1. Choné, Philippe & Linnemer, Laurent, 2010. "Optimal litigation strategies with observable case preparation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 271-288, November.
  2. Rohan Pitchford & Mark L. J. Wright, 2012. "Holdouts in Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Theory of Negotiation in a Weak Contractual Environment," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 79(2), pages 812-837.
  3. Patrice Bougette & Christian Montet & Florent Venayre, 2006. "Jeux de négociation dans les affaires antitrust : engagements et transaction," Post-Print halshs-00476774, HAL.
  4. Andrew F. Daughety & Reinganum F. Reinganum, 2014. "Settlement and Trial: Selected Analyses of the Bargaining Environment," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 14-00005, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.

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