On the optimal use of commitment decisions under European competition law
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- Philippe Choné & Saïd Souam & Arnold Vialfont, 2014. "On the optimal use of commitment decisions under European competition law," Post-Print hal-01410600, HAL.
References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Tim Reuter, 2016. "Private antitrust enforcement and the role of harmed parties in public enforcement," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 41(3), pages 479-507, June.
- GAUTIER, Axel & PETIT, Nicolas, 2014. "Optimal enforcement of competition policy : the commitments procedure under uncertainty," CORE Discussion Papers 2014063, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- repec:kap:ejlwec:v:45:y:2018:i:2:d:10.1007_s10657-018-9578-7 is not listed on IDEAS
More about this item
KeywordsCommitment decisions; Deterrence; Enforcement of competition law; Credibility;
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