Asymmetric information, pretrial negotiation and optimal decoupling
No abstract is available for this item.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Gary S. Becker, 1968.
"Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 76, pages 169.
- Lewis, Tracy R. & Sappington, David E. M., 1999. "Using decoupling and deep pockets to mitigate judgment-proof problems1," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 275-293, June.
- A. Mitchell Polinsky & Yeon-Koo Che, 1991.
"Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation,"
NBER Working Papers
3634, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- A. Mitchell Polinsky & Yeon-Koo Che, 1991. "Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(4), pages 562-570, Winter.
- Jennifer F. Reinganum & Louise L. Wilde, 1986. "Settlement, Litigation, and the Allocation of Litigation Costs," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(4), pages 557-566, Winter.
- Kahan, Marcel & Tuckman, Bruce, 1995. "Special levies on punitive damages: Decoupling, agency problems, and litigation expenditures," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 175-185, June.
- Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2000.
"Found Money? Split-Award Statutes and Settlement of Punitive Damages Cases,"
Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers
0001, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics, revised Mar 2001.
- Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2003. "Found Money? Split-Award Statutes and Settlement of Punitive Damages Cases," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 5(1), pages 134-164.
- Rubinstein, Ariel, 1985. "A Bargaining Model with Incomplete Information about Time Preferences," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(5), pages 1151-72, September.
- Polinsky, Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 1979. "The Optimal Tradeoff between the Probability and Magnitude of Fines," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 69(5), pages 880-91, December.
- Albert Choi & Chris Sanchirico, .
"Should Plaintiffs Win What Defendants Lose?: Litigation Stakes, Litigation Effort, and the Benefits of 'Decoupling',"
Scholarship at Penn Law
upenn_wps-1000, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
- Albert Choi & Chris William Sanchirico, 2004. "Should Plaintiffs Win What Defendants Lose? Litigation Stakes, Litigation Effort, and the Benefits of Decoupling," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 33(2), pages 323-354, 06.
- Lucian Arye Bebchuk, 1984. "Litigation and Settlement under Imperfect Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(3), pages 404-415, Autumn.
- Chen, Kong-Pin & Chien, Hung-Ken & Chu, C Y Cyrus, 1997. "Sequential versus Unitary Trials with Asymmetric Information," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(1), pages 239-58, January.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:27:y:2007:i:3:p:312-329. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Shamier, Wendy)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.