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A Positive Economic Theory of Regulatory Enforcement

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  • Fenn, P
  • Veljanovski, C G

Abstract

A positive economic model of regulatory enforcement is developed th at allows the agency to use both legal and informal methods to gain compliance with the law. The paper fills a gap in the economic literature on regulation by developing and testing a model of enforcement. It also provides a theoretical framework for the recent empirical work of political scientists and sociologists on enforcement practices. Copyright 1988 by Royal Economic Society.

Suggested Citation

  • Fenn, P & Veljanovski, C G, 1988. "A Positive Economic Theory of Regulatory Enforcement," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 98(393), pages 1055-1070, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:98:y:1988:i:393:p:1055-70
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Quintano, Claudio & Mazzocchi, Paolo, 2013. "The shadow economy beyond European public governance," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 37(4), pages 650-670.
    2. Timo Goeschl & Ole Jürgens, 2014. "Criminalizing environmental offences: when the prosecutor’s helping hand hurts," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 199-219, April.
    3. Choné, Philippe & Souam, Saïd & Vialfont, Arnold, 2014. "On the optimal use of commitment decisions under European competition law," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 169-179.
    4. Timo Goeschl & Johannes Jarke, 2013. "The warnings puzzle: an upstream explanation," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 44(3), pages 339-360, December.
    5. Nuno Garoupa, 2004. "Punish Once or Punish Twice: A Theory of the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Addition to Regulatory Penalties," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(2), pages 410-433.
    6. Carillo, Maria Rosaria & Pugno, Maurizio, 2004. "The underground economy and underdevelopment," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 257-279, September.
    7. Philippe Choné & Saïd Souam & Arnold Vialfont, 2012. "Commitments in Antitrust," EconomiX Working Papers 2012-9, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
    8. Levenson, Alec R. & Maloney, William F., 1998. "The informal sector, firm dynamics, and institutional participation," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1988, The World Bank.
    9. Calel, Raphael & Dechezlepretre, Antoine & Venmans, Frank, 2023. "Policing carbon markets," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 120565, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    10. Jost, Peter-J., 1997. "Regulatory enforcement in the presence of a court system," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 491-508, December.
    11. Cento Veljanovski, 2021. "The Impact of Employers' Liability on 19th‐Century U.K. Coalmining Fatalities," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 18(3), pages 660-683, September.
    12. Suurmond, Guido, 2007. "The effects of the enforcement strategy," MPRA Paper 21142, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Philippe Choné & Saïd Souam & Arnold Vialfont, 2012. "Commitments in Antitrust," Working Papers hal-04141127, HAL.
    14. Amacher, Gregory S. & Malik, Arun S., 1998. "Instrument Choice When Regulators and Firms Bargain," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 225-241, May.
    15. Anthony Ogus, 1998. "Regulatory Appraisal: A Neglected Opportunity for Law and Economics," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 6(1), pages 53-68, July.
    16. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 1986. "A Note on Optimal Public Enforcement with Settlements and Litigation Costs," NBER Working Papers 2114, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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