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Le droit de la concurrence et les procédures négociées

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  • Arnold Vialfont

Abstract

We examine the antitrust enforcement policies of the European Commission and of the French Competition Council. Negotiated procedures – i.e. leniency programmes, commitments and “no-contest” procedures – may improve the efficiency of the intervention of an authority when deterrence has not come from the market, but also when fines are not optimal to incite competitive behavior in the future. These three negotiated procedures consist in a reduction of the fine that may be imposed on firms when they cooperate by providing evidence of the illegal conduct or give information of the existence of such conduct. They are part of an optimal enforcement practice in that they allow to optimize it. We also examine their interaction with other antitrust provisions.

Suggested Citation

  • Arnold Vialfont, 2007. "Le droit de la concurrence et les procédures négociées," Revue internationale de droit économique, De Boeck Université, vol. 0(2), pages 157-184.
  • Handle: RePEc:cai:riddbu:ride_212_0157
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    Cited by:

    1. Philippe Choné & Saïd Souam & Arnold Vialfont, 2012. "Commitments in Antitrust," EconomiX Working Papers 2012-9, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
    2. Choné, Philippe & Souam, Saïd & Vialfont, Arnold, 2014. "On the optimal use of commitment decisions under European competition law," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 169-179.

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