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Settlement implications of lawyer advertising

Author

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  • Friehe, Tim
  • Gabuthy, Yannick
  • Lambert, Eve-Angéline

Abstract

This paper explores how informative attorney advertising influences the settlement probability and/or offer, using a screening framework. Plaintiffs are privately informed about the expected judgment and their level of ability in controlling the lawyer. More attorney advertising increases case filings by plaintiffs with high or low ability to different extents such that the defendant's beliefs about the plaintiff's type change with the level of attorney advertising. How attorney advertising influences settlement outcomes then depends on whether the defendant offers a higher settlement offer to more able plaintiffs.

Suggested Citation

  • Friehe, Tim & Gabuthy, Yannick & Lambert, Eve-Angéline, 2020. "Settlement implications of lawyer advertising," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:61:y:2020:i:c:s0144818819302716
    DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2019.105870
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Attorney advertising; Litigation; Plaintiff heterogeneity; Updating;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process

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