Sharing of Information Prior to Settlement or Litigation
In this article the voluntary sharing of information prior to settlement negotiations is studied in a model where one type of litigant -- plaintiffs, to be exact -- possesses private information. In equilibrium, plaintiffs whose expected judgments would exceed a certain threshold will reveal their information (if they can credibly establish it) and settle for higher amounts than if they were silent; plaintiffs with lower expected judgments will remain silent and settle. The effect of the legal right of "discovery" is also examined.
Volume (Year): 20 (1989)
Issue (Month): 2 (Summer)
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