The Unexpected Effects of Caps on Non-Economic Damages
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- Avraham, Ronen & Bustos, Álvaro, 2010. "The unexpected effects of caps on non-economic damages," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 291-305, December.
References listed on IDEAS
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- Zhou, J., 2010. "Access to justice : An economic approach," Other publications TiSEM 9d70f451-35c4-4878-92bf-7, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Landeo, Claudia & Nikitin, Maxim & Izmalkov, Sergei, 2012.
"Playing against an Apparent Opponent: Incentives for Care, Litigation, and Damage Caps under Self-Serving Bias,"
2012-15, University of Alberta, Department of Economics, revised 01 Oct 2012.
- Landeo, Claudia & Nikitin, Maxim & Izmalkov, Sergei, 2012. "Playing against an Apparent Opponent: Incentives for Care, Litigation, and Damage Caps under Self-Serving Bias," Working Papers 2012-9, University of Alberta, Department of Economics.
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More about this item
KeywordsTort reform; caps on recoveries; length of dispute resolution;
- K13 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Tort Law and Product Liability; Forensic Economics
- K20 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - General
- K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
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