Playing against an Apparent Opponent: Incentives for Care, Litigation, and Damage Caps under Self-Serving Bias
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- Landeo, Claudia & Nikitin, Maxim & Izmalkov, Sergei, 2012. "Playing against an Apparent Opponent: Incentives for Care, Litigation, and Damage Caps under Self-Serving Bias," Working Papers 2012-15, University of Alberta, Department of Economics, revised 01 Oct 2012.
References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
Keywordssettlement; litigation; incentives for care; caps on non-economic damages; self-serving bias; asymmetric information; apparent opponents; perfect Bayesian equilibrium; motivated reasoning; divergent beliefs; universal divinity refinement; motivated anchoring; non-cooperative games; disputes; pretrial bargaining;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- J52 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation
- J58 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Public Policy
- K13 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Tort Law and Product Liability; Forensic Economics
- K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
- Z18 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Public Policy
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-04-23 (All new papers)
- NEP-EXP-2012-04-23 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2012-04-23 (Game Theory)
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