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Network geometry and the scope of the median voter theorem

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  • Stefano Vannucci

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Abstract

It is shown that the median voter theorem for committee-decisions holds over a full unimodal preference domain whenever (i) the underlying median interval space satisfi?es interval antiexchange and (ii) unimodality is defi?ned with respect to the incidence-geometry of the relevant outcome space or network. Thus, in particular, the interval spaces canonically induced by trees do support the median voter theorem on their own full unimodal preference domains. Conversely, validity of the median voter theorem on the full unimodal preference domain of a certain median interval space on a discrete outcome space requires that the graph canonically induced by that interval space be precisely a tree.

Suggested Citation

  • Stefano Vannucci, 2015. "Network geometry and the scope of the median voter theorem," Department of Economics University of Siena 704, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
  • Handle: RePEc:usi:wpaper:704
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    File URL: http://repec.deps.unisi.it/quaderni/704.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Hansen, Pierre & Thisse, Jacques-Francois, 1981. "Outcomes of voting and planning : Condorcet, Weber and Rawls locations," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 1-15, August.
    2. Wendell, R. E. & McKelvey, R. D., 1981. "New perspectives in competitive location theory," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 6(2), pages 174-182, February.
    3. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65, pages 135-135.
    4. Bandelt, Hans-Jurgen, 1985. "Networks with condorcet solutions," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 314-326, June.
    5. Danilov, Vladimir I., 1994. "The structure of non-manipulable social choice rules on a tree," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 123-131, April.
    6. H. Moulin, 1980. "On strategy-proofness and single peakedness," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 437-455, January.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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