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Condorcet winners on median spaces

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  • Buechel, Berno

Abstract

We characterize the outcome of majority voting for single--peaked preferences on median spaces. This large class of preferences covers a variety of multi--dimensional policy spaces including products of lines (e.g.\ grids), trees, and hypercubes. Our main result is the following: If a Condorcet winner (i.e.\ a winner in pairwise majority voting) exists, then it coincides with the appropriately defined median (``the median voter''). This result generalizes previous findings which are either restricted to a one--dimensional policy space or to the assumption that any two voters with the same preference peak must have identical preferences. The result applies to models of spatial competition between two political candidates. A bridge to the graph--theoretic literature is built.

Suggested Citation

  • Buechel, Berno, 2012. "Condorcet winners on median spaces," MPRA Paper 44625, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 27 Feb 2013.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:44625
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Wendell, R. E. & McKelvey, R. D., 1981. "New perspectives in competitive location theory," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 6(2), pages 174-182, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Bennett, Daniel L. & Long, Jason T., 2019. "Is it the economic policy, stupid? Economic policy, political parties & the gubernatorial incumbent advantage," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 118-137.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    majority rule; median voter theorem; Condorcet winner; generalized single--peakedness; median spaces; Hotelling; Weber Point;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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