Cooperation with Strategy-Dependent Uncertainty Attitude
The paper shows that in a Prisoner’s Dilemma Knightian uncertainty, formalised by multiple priors, may entail cooperation at a generalised Nash Equilibrium. The main idea is that players may have an attitude towards uncertainty that depends upon their available strategies. In particular, if players anticipate to be sufficiently more optimistic when choosing to cooperate, than when defecting, then they may indeed cooperate. Though uncommon in economic modelling, choice-dependent uncertainty attitude formalises a behaviour which is well understood and widely accepted by cognitive psychologists, within the theory of Cognitive Dissonance.
|Date of creation:||Jul 2005|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Piazza S.Francesco,7 - 53100 Siena|
Web page: http://www.deps.unisi.it/
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Kin Chung Lo, 1995.
"Extensive Form Games with Uncertainty Averse Players,"
ecpap-95-03, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- Lo, Kin Chung, 1999. "Extensive Form Games with Uncertainty Averse Players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 256-270, August.
- Kin Chung Lo, 1995.
"Equilibrium in Beliefs Under Uncertainty,"
ecpap-95-02, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- David Schmeidler, 1989.
"Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
7662, David K. Levine.
- Schmeidler, David, 1989. "Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 571-87, May.
- Marinacci, Massimo, 2000. "Ambiguous Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 191-219, May.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:usi:wpaper:457. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Fabrizio Becatti)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.